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As signs of climate change increase and fossil fuel sources of 
energy rise in long-term price and scarcity, countries are paying 
ever more attention to the intersections that exist between energy 
and environmental policy. China’s energy/environmental crisis in 
particular has received major international attention recently, as 
China’s continued growth positions it as a key player in solving 
the climate change and energy supply crises of the present and 
future. A November 2007 article in The New York Times series 
“Choking on Growth: A series of articles and multimedia 
examining the human toll, global impact and political challenge of 
China’s epic pollution crisis” detailed China’s “energy 
conundrum” as a “no-win situation.”1 China is faced with bad and 
 
 * J.D. 2009, New York University School of Law; M.P.A., Columbia 
University; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I would like to 
thank the Natural Resources Defense Council’s Beijing Office for providing the 
impetus for the paper that became this note, and Barbara Finamore of NRDC and 
Professor Stewart of NYU Law for providing invaluable guidance and oversight. 
I would also like to thank the staff of the NYU Environmental Law Journal for 
their thoughtful revisions and superb editing. 
 1 Jim Yardley, At Chinese Dams, Problems Rise with Water, N.Y. TIMES, 
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worse choices between building huge hydropower dams displacing 
millions of people or adding more dirty coal-fired power plants to 
meet its burgeoning energy demand.2 In the face of these 
unappealing choices, one solution stands out as almost 
incontrovertibly good: increasing energy efficiency as an 
alternative to increasing energy supply. In addition to addressing 
supply challenges, a robust energy efficiency policy brings energy 
security, reduced emissions, cost-effectiveness, economic 
competitiveness, local job creation, and sustainability.3 
The European Union (EU) has been at the vanguard of 
passing forward-thinking energy efficiency policies over the past 
two decades, although it is still grappling with achieving full 
implementation of these policies. More recently, China has also 
been active in making energy efficiency a part of its national 
energy strategy. However, China has struggled to craft effective 
energy efficiency laws and to achieve implementation of these 
laws throughout the country. If successful, the potential for 
improvements and energy savings in China is tremendous. China 
has begun to decouple its GDP and its growth in energy 
consumption over the past twenty years,4 but it still uses five times 
as much energy as the EU to produce one unit of GDP because its 
gains in energy efficiency have not kept pace with its rapid 
growth.5 This inefficiency, coupled with the massive continued 
 
Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (quoting Jonathan Sinton, China program manager at the 
International Energy Agency). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Commission of the European Communities, Impact Assessment Report for 
the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency 3 (Commission Staff Working Document 
2006) [hereinafter Working Document for Action Plan], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action_plan_energy_efficiency/doc/impact_assessmen
t_report_en.pdf; European Commission, Mobilising Public and Private Finance 
Towards Global Access to Climate-friendly, Affordable and Secure Energy 
Services: The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, at 3, COM 
(2006) 583 final (Oct. 6, 2006).  See also MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH AT WHAT COST? xiv (2007) 
(recognizing energy efficiency as the most cost-effective (actually as a negative-
cost) option for emissions reductions in the United States). 
 4 China’s GDP averaged 9.7 percent growth per year while energy 
consumption rose 4.6 percent per year from 1980 to 2000. Michael B. 
Cummings, Helping the Dragon Leapfrog: A Survey of Chinese Energy Policy 
and U.S. Energy Diplomacy at the Crossroads, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10526, 10527 
(2006) (citing DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER OF THE STATE COUNCIL, 
CHINA’S NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY AND POLICY 2000–2020, at 3 (2003)). 
 5 European Commission, Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, at 6, COM 
(2005) 265 final (June 22, 2005) [hereinafter Green Paper].  See also Justin 
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growth projected for China in the coming decades, creates 
opportunities to save (or waste) vast amounts of energy, depending 
on the extent to which China can implement effective energy 
efficiency policies.6 The Chinese government has made 
considerable progress in enacting new energy policies and in 
showing awareness of the energy challenges it faces. However, 
most commentators express doubt in the central government’s 
ability to implement and follow through on its stated policy goals.7 
Experts identify implementation and enforcement of existing laws, 
as well as creating better incentives for investment in energy 
efficiency, as key goals for making energy efficiency a successful 
part of China’s energy future.8 
This note seeks to detail the key strategies that the EU has 
adopted in the field of energy efficiency, and then to draw lessons 
from the EU’s experience that might be helpful as China moves 
forward in implementing its own energy efficiency policy. While 
the EU still has far to go in achieving its energy efficiency 
potential, its fifteen years of experience in crafting and 
implementing energy efficiency laws offer some valuable insights 
from its successes and persisting challenges. The EU is the focus 
of this note not only because of its leadership and voluminous 
activity in the field of energy efficiency, but also because its 
governmental structure parallels China’s in some instructive ways. 
 
Blood, Note, Energy Production Pollution in China—The Effectiveness of Two 
Forms of Chinese Governmental Response to the Problem, 19 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 156 (2007). China also lags considerably behind the 
U.S. in reducing its energy intensity; the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s 2008 analysis shows that China uses approximately four times 
more energy than the U.S.—whereas the U.S. used 8841 btu/2000 U.S. dollars in 
2006, China used 34,931 btu/2000 U.S. dollars (measured by market exchange 
rates). See Energy Information Administration, World Energy Intensity (2008), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/tablee1g.xls. 
 6 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 4, at 10531. 
 7 See, e.g., id. at 10545; Wang Mingyuan, Issues Related to the 
Implementation of China’s Energy Law: Analysis of the Energy Conservation 
Law and the Renewable Energy Law as Examples, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 225, 228 
(2007); Wang Qingyi, Energy Conservation as Security, CHINA SECURITY, 
Summer 2006, at 89, 96–97. 
 8 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 4, at 10545; Srini Sitaraman, Regulating 
the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and Pollution 
Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
267, 309–11 (explaining that one of China’s critical challenges is that while the 
national government sets environmental policy, the local governments are often 
unwilling to implement, enforce, and finance these policies). 
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That is, the EU’s supranational government oversees an incredibly 
diverse range of EU member states, each with national 
governments that diverge in priorities and capabilities. Similarly, 
China’s national government works with a diverse range of 
provincial governments that are in charge of much of the day-to-
day implementation of national laws and policies. Thus, the 
lessons learned from the EU’s struggles with balancing 
responsibilities between levels of government may help China in 
its similar effort.  Ideally, this will help “the Dragon [l]eap-frog” 
some of the EU’s energy efficiency challenges, a strategy that 
Michael Cummings recently suggested will be critical to China’s 
success in this area.9 
This note focuses on three of the critical challenges facing 
China that have also been major components of the EU’s energy 
efficiency policy development: implementation, enforcement, and 
financing.  Part I of the note provides an overview of EU energy 
efficiency law and policy. It first summarizes the EU’s lawmaking 
institutions and capabilities, and then briefly highlights key aspects 
of EU energy efficiency law in each of the major sectors (end-use 
electricity, buildings, household appliances and energy-using 
products, and industry).  Finally, it summarizes some of the EU’s 
key goals for future energy efficiency policy.  This overview 
explicitly focuses on regulation of the electricity sector as opposed 
to the transport sector, simply for the purpose of limiting its scope 
to a manageable size.10  Part II describes the EU’s process, 
progress, and challenges in the implementation of these laws, and 
Part III describes the enforcement mechanisms used to achieve 
greater implementation.  Part IV outlines the major financing tools 
that the EU uses to incentivize the adoption of cost-effective 
 
 9 See Cummings, supra note 4, at 10531 (“Perhaps as equally important [as 
China’s energy law and policy development] will be the policies of other 
countries—especially the EU, Japan, and the United States as they relate to 
cleaner energy technologies—in helping to shape this [China’s development] 
trajectory.”). 
 10 Energy efficiency in transport is another important goal in both the EU and 
China; further research analyzing transferable lessons in this sector would be 
worthwhile. But at least one expert has suggested that the appropriate policies for 
the transport sector might be somewhat easier to implement, and that “more 
problematic for China, the region, and the world is the rapid near-term 
development of the Chinese electricity sector.” Cummings, supra note 4, at 
10534. Hopefully, many of the lessons in implementation and enforcement 
gleaned in this paper will be transferable to the field of transport energy 
efficiency though the laws themselves are not covered in detail here. 
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energy efficiency measures.  Finally, Part V draws on the 
similarities and differences between the EU and China to suggest 
some ways in which Chinese policy-makers could adapt the 
lessons learned from the European energy efficiency experience to 
help in the crafting, implementation, enforcement, and financing of 
China’s own energy efficiency policy. 
While this note’s conclusions are focused on lessons that 
China could draw from EU energy efficiency policy, its analysis of 
the EU’s experience offers insights applicable to other developed 
and developing countries as well.  By contextualizing and focusing 
primarily on the EU’s successes and struggles with energy 
efficiency, and then drawing some broad lessons that could assist 
China’s particular situation, this note might lend ideas to policy-
makers in myriad other countries.  These policy-makers can and 
should evaluate the EU’s experience and potentially applicable 
lessons in the context of their countries’ own political, economic, 
and institutional structures. 
I. EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY INSTITUTIONS AND LAW 
A. The EU’s Governmental Structure 
The EU is a community of twenty-seven “Member States” 
that have consented to relinquishing some sovereignty to the EU’s 
supranational institutions.11  The key institutions in EU lawmaking 
and implementation are the European Parliament, the Council of 
the European Union, and the European Commission. The 
Parliament is made up of members directly elected via national 
elections every five years in each Member State.12  In contrast, the 
Council is made up of one representative of each Member State, 
depending at any given time on the subject matter under 
discussion.13  The Parliament and the Council jointly share 
legislative responsibilities for passing the laws governing energy 
efficiency, and the Parliament has the additional function of 
supervising the Commission.14 
 
 11 KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION LAW 25 (3d ed. 2007). 
 12 Id. at 27. 
 13 Id. at 31–32.  For example, if an environmental issue is being discussed by 
the Council, typically the environmental minister of each Member State will 
attend.  Id. 
 14 Id. at 28–33. 
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The European Commission is the Community’s civil service. 
But, it has more authority than many civil services, with 
legislative, administrative, executive, and quasi-judicial 
functions.15 It has the important role of initiating draft legislation 
sent to the Council. Additionally, the Commission supervises the 
implementation of legislation once passed, manages the EU’s 
annual budget, and investigates and brings Member States that it 
believes to be in violation of EU obligations before the European 
Court of Justice.16  The Commission’s Directorate General for 
Transportation and Energy is charged with managing laws related 
to energy efficiency (and energy policy in general).17  For the most 
part, this note focuses on the work of the Commission as the key 
authority involved in the post-enactment stages of energy 
efficiency law and policy, given the note’s focus on 
implementation, enforcement, and financing. 
B. The EU’s Lawmaking Framework 
Because the EU is a collection of sovereign Member States, it 
only has authority to legislate in those areas for which the Member 
States have ceded authority to the EU.18  The EU’s current legal 
framework19 does not permit the EU to establish an overarching 
common energy policy (though the proposed but not yet ratified 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would allow for a 
more comprehensive EU energy policy).20  Thus, actions to 
 
 15 Id. at 37. 
 16 Id. at 37–39. 
 17 European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 
Mission of the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
dgs/energy_transport/wcm/mission_dg_tren.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 18 See DAVIES, supra note 11, at 14. 
 19 The EU’s framework is currently governed by the Treaty on the EU and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Communities as amended by the Treaty of 
Nice in 2001. Treaty of Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1. Further 
references will be made to the most recent consolidated version of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty]. 
 20 Itziar Martínez de Alegría Mancisidor et al., European Union’s Renewable 
Energy Sources and Energy Efficiency Policy Review: The Spanish Perspective, 
13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 100, 101 & n.7 (2009). Recently, 
the future of the Treaty has been thrown even further into doubt, as Ireland failed 
to ratify the proposed Treaty of Lisbon in June 2008. However, many European 
leaders still express hope that a resolution can be reached that does not declare 
the Treaty dead. See Euractiv, EU Treaty: What Next?, July 22, 2008, 
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promote energy efficiency have developed under other 
justifications found in the European Union Treaty (including 
external relations, internal market, and the environment), leading 
to what some have criticized as a fragmented group of policies.21 
Moreover, the EU principle of subsidiarity plays an important 
role in the development and implementation of energy efficiency 
laws.  Subsidiarity is a federalist principle, formally recognized in 
the European Union Treaty.22  The principle “provides that 
decisions relating to areas where the Community and the Member 
States have joint competence to act should be taken at the most 
appropriate level, as close to the citizen as possible, providing 
there is no loss of effectiveness.”23  In keeping with this principle, 
the vast majority of EU energy efficiency laws are in the form of 
directives.24  Directives are binding on the Member States as to the 
result to be achieved, but leave the choice of methods to the 
Member States.25  Generally, the rights and obligations created by 
a directive only become effective once incorporated by the 
Member States into national law.26  The advantage of directives is 
that they provide a far greater degree of flexibility to Member 
States in choosing how to best achieve a specific goal than do 
regulations (which are fully binding without further legislative 
action at the Member State level).27 On the other hand, 
enforcement of directives presents some challenges, discussed 
infra Part III. 
 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-treaty/article-174339. 
 21 See Martínez et al., supra note 20, at 101 (“[A]ctions related to promote 
[renewable energy sources] and [energy efficiency] have developed under 
different policies . . . resulting in a lack of transparency for both political 
decision makers and industry.”). 
 22 DAVIES, supra note 11, at 25. 
 23 Id. 
 24 The Buildings Directive illustrates its commitment to subsidiarity 
explicitly: “general principles providing for a system of energy performance 
requirements and its objectives should be established at Community level, but 
the detailed implementation should be left to Member States, thus allowing each 
Member State to choose the regime which corresponds best to its particular 
situation.” Council Directive 2002/91, On the Energy Performance of Buildings, 
finding 21, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 65, 66 (EC) [hereinafter Buildings Directive]. 
 25 EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 249, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 132. 
 26 DAVIES, supra note 11, at 50. 
 27 Id. at 49–50. 
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C. Overview of Current EU Energy Efficiency Laws 
The first European energy efficiency policy developed in the 
wake of the 1973 oil crisis,28 but work on energy efficiency 
declined as the crisis abated. It did not begin again in earnest until 
environmental concerns over energy consumption surfaced in the 
1990s.29  After a series of directives during the 1990s, the 
European Commission developed a concrete Action Plan on 
energy efficiency for the period 2000–2006 that led to the 
promulgation of updated directives on buildings and products.30 
Most recently, the EU passed a more comprehensive directive on 
energy efficiency, which sets an efficiency goal to be reached by 
all Member States and requires each Member State to develop an 
action plan outlining how it will achieve it. 
On the whole, EU actions have moved from more fragmented, 
sector-specific policies in earlier years to more comprehensive 
regulations, covering a broader range of products and services. 
One commentator has characterized EU energy efficiency policy 
as a dual approach of “market pull,” whereby energy efficiency 
information is provided to consumers in order to pull the market in 
the right direction, and “market push,” whereby minimum 
efficiency requirements are enacted to remove energy inefficient 
products and services from the market.31 EU laws tend to be 
organized by sector, often with these ‘push’ and ‘pull’ mechanisms 
at work in each individual sector. The following section provides 
an overview of the major EU laws governing energy efficiency, 
which are also summarized in Table 1. 
 
 28 Véronique Bruggeman, Energy Efficiency as a Criterion for Regulation in 
the European Community, 13 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 140, 140 (2004). 
 29 See id. 
 30 Communication from the Commission (EC) No. 14349, Action Plan for 
Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential (Oct. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Action 
Plan], available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st14/st14349 
.en06.pdf. 
 31 Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 142. 
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TABLE 1. MAJOR EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY LAWS32 
 
Year Sectoral Focus Title Summary of Key 
Provisions 
2006 Comprehensive Directive 2006/32/EC on 
energy end-use efficiency 
and energy services  
Requires Member 
States to adopt a 
national indicative 
(non-binding) target for 
energy efficiency of 9 
percent savings from 
2008 levels by 2016, 
and requires Member 
States to submit 
national action plans 
detailing their plans for 
achieving the target.  
2005 All products, 
potentially  
Directive 2005/32/EC 
establishing a framework 
for the setting of eco-




which the Commission 
can regulate any 
energy-using products. 
Between 2007 and 
2008, the Commission 
is beginning to adopt 
eco-design 
requirements in the 
form of implementing 
directives for fourteen 
product groups, 






electric motors, and 
street lighting. 
2004 Cogeneration Directive 2004/8/EC on the 
promotion of cogeneration 
based on a useful heat 
demand in the internal 
energy market  
Requires Member 
States to prepare 
national assessments of 
their potential for high 
efficiency cogeneration 
and to implement a 
system of Guarantees 
of Origin to track 
electricity produced 
from cogeneration.  
 
 32 This table draws from the referenced Directives to create short synopses of 
the major laws; each law is discussed in more detail infra Part I(C). 
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2003 Energy Taxes Directive 2003/96/EC on 
energy taxation 
Harmonizes Member 
State energy taxes to a 
specified floor by 
requiring minimum 
taxes for motor fuels, 
gas oil, heating fuels, 
and electricity. 




establishing a scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within 
the Community 
Establishes a cap and 
trade scheme for 
greenhouse gas 
emissions, which may 
indirectly encourage 
energy efficiency 
innovations as part of 
an emissions reduction 
strategy.  
2002 Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC on 
the energy performance of 
buildings 
Requires each Member 
State to develop a 
methodology to 
calculate the energy 
efficiency of buildings 
and set standards that 
new buildings and 
large buildings 
undergoing renovation 
must meet.  
1992 Domestic 
Appliances 
Directive 92/75/EEC on 
the indication by labeling 
and standard product 
information of the 
consumption of energy and 
other resources by 
household appliances 
Requires suppliers to 
label household 
appliances offered for 
sale with information 
relating to their 
consumption of energy. 
To date, specific 
regulations have been 
passed for refrigerators, 
freezers, ovens, air 
conditioners, 
dishwashers, lamps, 




1. End-use Energy Efficiency 
The most recent EU energy efficiency directive also has the 
potential to be the most comprehensive, as it aims to achieve 
overall national reductions in energy consumption rather than 
focusing on particular sectors, as other directives do. Directive 
2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and energy services 
requires Member States to create national plans for achieving a 9 
percent energy efficiency savings by 2016, as measured from 
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January 1, 2008.33 The directive applies to supply and distribution 
of electricity, gas, heating, and fuels to households, transport, and 
industrial consumers.34  Member States are required to establish a 
national authority to implement the law and report progress 
towards achieving the national target, and are also required to 
introduce energy efficiency improvements into their public 
sectors.35  To help the Commission track progress, Member States 
must establish interim three-year targets as well, and must submit 
periodic progress reports to the Commission.36  However, the 9 
percent target and all interim targets are explicitly non-binding and 
not legally enforceable.37 Thus, while the Directive requires some 
public sector leadership and attempts to cajole at least some annual 
progress by requiring yearly reports, it imposes no real quantitative 
obligations on Member States.38  The directive is therefore more of 
a monitoring tool than anything else, especially because it charges 
the Commission to produce periodic reports on the success of 
achieving national targets and to recommend any additional action 
that needs to be taken at the Community level.39 
 
 33 Council Directive 2006/32, On Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy 
Services, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 114) 64, 69 (EC) [hereinafter End-use Energy 
Directive]. 
 34 Id. art. 2, at 67. 
 35 Id. art. 4–6, at 69–70. 
 36 Id. art. 4, 14, at 69, 72–73. 
 37 Id., at 65. While there was some debate over whether the national targets 
should be binding, and a strong push from Denmark at the Council of the 
European Union, ultimately a majority of delegates opposed binding targets, 
arguing that the potential for further energy efficiency savings varies too greatly 
from one Member State to another to make binding targets equitable. See 
Council of the European Union, TTE (Energy) Council, TTE (Energy) Council 
on 23 November 2006 Energy Policy for Europe Sustainability of Energy 
Production and Consumption: Promoting Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy—Adoption of Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Energy 
Efficiency, § II, Doc. 15210/06 (Nov. 16, 2006), available at http://register. 
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st15/st15210.en06.pdf. 
 38 Other noteworthy foci of the directive include informational reporting 
requirements for energy distributors and energy sales companies, reformation of 
existing financing and tariff rules surrounding energy efficiency, and Member 
State provision of energy audits and advanced energy metering for individual 
customers. End-Use Energy Directive, supra note 33, arts. 6–13, at 70–72. 
 39 Id., art. 14, at 72–73. 
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2. Buildings 
Legislation governing the energy efficiency of buildings began 
in 1989, with the passage of a directive on construction materials.40  
Further legislation passed in the 1990s addressed the regulation of 
boilers41 and energy certification requirements for buildings.42  In 
2002, the Community passed a more comprehensive buildings 
directive, which is now the key law governing the energy 
performance of buildings.43 
Directive 2002/91/EC on the energy performance of buildings 
begins by acknowledging that buildings account for approximately 
forty percent of European Union energy consumption and 
therefore offer a huge potential for energy efficiency savings.44  
The directive first requires Member States to adopt a methodology 
to calculate the energy performance of buildings, at a national or 
regional level.45  Member States must then set minimum energy 
performance requirements for new buildings and renovations on 
existing large buildings.46  All necessary national laws, regulations, 
and administrative provisions to comply with the directive must be 
in place by 2009.47  When fully implemented, the measures in the 
directive should supply a savings of around forty million tons of 
oil equivalent (Mtoe) through the year 2020.48  After 2009, the 
 
 40 Council Directive 89/106, On the Approximation of Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Relating to Construction 
Products, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 12 (EEC). 
 41 Council Directive 92/42, 1992 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC). 
 42 Council Directive 93/76, To Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions by 
Improving Energy Efficiency (SAVE), 1993 O.J. (L 237) 28 (EEC). 
 43 Buildings Directive, supra note 24. 
 44 Id. finding 6, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 65. 
 45 Id. art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67. 
 46 Id. art. 6, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 68. Large buildings are currently defined as 
those buildings “with a total useful floor area over 1000 m2.” Id.  Member States 
are also required to make available to owners, buyers, and tenants energy 
performance certificates that detail the energy performance of the building and 
include legal standards and benchmarks to allow for comparison. Id. art. 7, 2003 
O.J. (L 1) at 68. Finally, the directive also requires that boilers and air 
conditioning systems be inspected on a regular basis.  Id. art. 8, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 
68. 
 47 In fact, article 15 calls for full adoption of the directive by January 2006, 
Buildings Directive, supra note 24, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 69, but the Commission 
has allowed Member States to apply for an additional period of three years to 
fully apply the provisions of the directive. See Action Plan, supra note 30, at 12 
n.25. 
 48 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 19. By way of comparison, total EU 
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Commission plans to propose an expanded scope for the directive 
(possibly including the imposition of requirements on small 
building renovations as well as large).49 
3. Domestic Appliance Labeling 
One of the EU’s earliest efforts at regulating energy efficiency 
was its 1992 passage of Directive 92/75/EEC on product 
labeling.50 The directive emphasized the power that accurate and 
comparable information provided to consumers can have on their 
purchasing choices and sought to capitalize on this potential.51 
This directive requires suppliers to label household appliances with 
information related to their consumption of energy.52 Specific rules 
promulgated under the directive between 1995 and 2003 include 
energy labeling requirements for household electric refrigerators 
and freezers, electric ovens, dishwashers, lamps, washers, and 
dryers.53 
The EU’s labeling laws are generally regarded as successful in 
promoting the use of more efficient products.54  Unfortunately, 
though, efficiency gains from labeling have been more than offset 
by steeply rising demand for household appliances.  That is, 
though individual products are becoming more efficient, the 
 
consumption in the year 2004 was 1745 Mtoe. Commission Annex to the Green 
Paper on A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, 
What is at Stake, Working Document, at 7 COM (2006) 105 final (Aug. 3, 2006) 
available at http://www.energy.eu/directives/2006_03_08_gp_working_ 
document_en.pdf. 
 49 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 12; Green Paper, supra note 5, at 19. 
 50 Council Directive 92/75, On the Indication by Labelling and Standard 
Product Information of the Consumption of Energy and Other Resources by 
Household Appliances, 1992 O.J. (L 297) 16 (EEC) [hereinafter Labeling 
Directive]. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. art. 2., at 17. 
 53 See Commission Directive 2003/66/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 170) 10 (EC) 
(electric refrigerators and freezers); Commission Directive 2002/40, 2002 O.J. (L 
128) 45 (EC) (electric ovens); Commission Directive 2002/31, 2002 O.J. (L 86) 
26 (EC) (air conditioners); Commission Directive 1999/9, 1999 O.J. (L 56) 46 
(EC) (dishwashers); Commission Directive 98/11, 1998 O.J. (L 71) 1 (EC) 
(lamps); Commission Directive 96/60, 1996 O.J. (L 266) 1 (EC) (washer-driers); 
Commission Directive 95/13, 1995 O.J. (L 136) 28 (EC) (tumble driers); 
Commission Directive 95/12, 1995 O.J. (L 136) 1 (EC) (washing machines). 
 54 Commission of the European Communities, Report on the Analysis of the 
Debate of the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, Working Document, at 8 COM 
(2005) 265 final (May 29, 2006). 
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overall rise in household appliance usage has resulted in a net 
increase in energy consumption.55  This conundrum suggests that 
labeling laws may need to be updated frequently to keep pace with 
growing use of appliances, both to ensure that they cover new 
appliances and that standards remain sufficiently stringent for 
regulated appliances. 
4. Cogeneration (Combined Heat and Power) 
In 2004, the EU adopted legislation on cogeneration to 
promote its ability to transform the waste of primary energy 
generation into usable by-products.56  Cogeneration, also known as 
combined heat and power (CHP) is the simultaneous generation in 
one process of thermal energy and electrical energy;57 typically, 
the thermal heat that would otherwise be wasted in electricity 
production is captured and used for heating or cooling.  In 1998, 
electricity from cogeneration accounted for 11 percent of total 
energy production in the EU; it is estimated that if this percentage 
were increased to 18 percent, the EU would save around 3 to 4 
percent of total gross energy consumption.58  The main 
accomplishments of the cogeneration directive are (1) requiring 
Member States to create a certification system known as 
“guarantees of origin” that ensures the authenticity of electricity 
produced from high efficiency cogeneration,59 and (2) the 
establishment of EU-wide efficiency standards for cogeneration by 
the EU commission.60  Guarantees of origin are electronic 
certificates issued from a national body to producers of electricity 
from cogeneration, and will allow Member States to directly verify 
and track the amount of cogeneration occurring.61  Although the 
directive does call for Member States to conduct analyses of the 
 
 55 See generally Edgar G. Hertwich, Consumption and the Rebound Effect: 
An Industrial Ecology Perspective, J. INDUS. ECOLOGY, Jan. 2005, at 85. 
 56 Council Directive 2004/8, On the Promotion of Cogeneration Based on a 
Useful Heat Demand in the Internal Energy Market, 2004 O.J. (L 52) 50 (EC) 
[hereinafter Cogeneration Directive]. 
 57 Id. art. 3, at 53. 
 58 ASSEMBLY OF EUROPEAN REGIONS, EU LEGISLATION ON ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY (2007), available at http://www.aer.eu/index.php?id=1592 (click on 
hyperlink for Note on EU energy efficiency policy). 
 59 Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 5, at 54. 
 60 Id. art. 4, at 53–54. 
 61 Id. art. 5, at 54. These are analogous to renewable energy credits in the 
U.S. See infra note 109. 
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cogeneration’s potential in their individual countries,62 it has been 
criticized for failing to establish any quantitative targets for the 
minimum amount of electricity that must come from 
cogeneration.63  Since passage of the directive, cogeneration has 
risen only from 11 to 13 percent of electricity consumed, and the 
Commission acknowledges that more action is necessary in this 
area to stimulate further progress.64 
5. Eco-design of Products 
In 2005, the EU passed a directive that establishes a 
framework for setting eco-design requirements for energy-using 
products, with the aim of increasing energy savings from all 
consumer products running on electricity.65  The directive 
establishes a “framework” that lays out broad goals and then 
instructs the Commission to adopt specific regulations through 
“implementing measures” that set product-specific energy 
efficiency requirements.66 It also requires Member States to 
designate a national authority that is responsible for testing and 
labeling all products entering the market, and for recalling any 
non-compliant products.67 
The Commission hoped to adopt eco-design requirements in 
the form of implementing directives for fourteen product groups 
from 2007 to 2008, including boilers, water heaters, consumer 
electronics, copying machines, televisions, standby modes, 
chargers, lighting, electric motors, and street lighting.68  Thus far 
the Commission has proposed, and Member States have approved, 
standards for office, industrial, and street lighting, and for set-top 
television boxes.69  These standards were approved by Parliament 
 
 62 Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 6, at 54. 
 63 See, e.g., Martínez de Alegría Mancisidor et al., supra note 20, at 104–05. 
 64 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 14. 
 65 Council Directive 2005/32, Establishing a Framework for the Setting of 
Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Using Products, 2005 O.J. (L 191) 29 (EC) 
[hereinafter Eco-Design Directive]. 
 66 Id., art. 15, at 39–41. 
 67 Id., arts. 3, 5, at 35–36. 
 68 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 10. 
 69 Press Release, European Commission Eco-design Regulatory Committee, 
Member States Endorse Commission Proposals to Reduce Electricity 
Consumption, IP/08/1419 (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Eco-design Regulatory 
Committee], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=IP/08/1419. 
WELTON.MACRO.DOC 8/16/2009  5:02:21 PM 
2009] TRANSFERRING EU EXPERIENCES 1437 
in early 2009.70  The Commission also introduced a new proposal 
in July 2008 to reduce the electricity used in standby mode for a 
number of products,71 and reported in fall 2008 that it plans to 
propose several more specific implementing measures in the 
coming months.72 
6. Indirect and Market Mechanisms 
 a.     Taxation 
While not directly a measure regulating energy efficiency, the 
EU’s 2003 Energy Tax Directive is designed in part to achieve 
more energy efficiency. The Directive requires Member States to 
harmonize their taxes to meet at least a minimum level of taxation 
for motor fuels, gas oil, heating fuels, and electricity by 2004. 
However, the Directive grants an extended timeline for compliance 
to a majority of Member States—it does not require full 
compliance until 2010.73 Implementation of these taxes has been 
one of the more contentious areas of policy in Europe; countries 
have raised diverse concerns including worries about the effects of 
the taxes on national competitiveness and about the regressivity of 
the taxes.74  Countries have been hesitant to pass any laws to 
harmonize taxation levels—no one appears willing to act first in 
the absence of commitments from other countries.75 
 
 70 Euractive, Parliament paves way for wider eco-design product list, Feb. 
18, 2009, http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy-efficiency/parliament-paves-way-
wider-eco-design-product-list/article-179566. 
 71 Memorandum, European Commission, Commission’s Proposals to Reduce 
Standby Electric Power Consumption, MEMO/08/488 (July 8, 2008), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/488& 
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
 72 See Eco-design Regulatory Committee, supra note 69. 
 73 Council Directive 2003/96, Restructuring the Community Framework for 
the Taxation of Energy Products and Electricity, art. 18, 2003 O.J. (L 283) 51, 
58–59 (EC). The extended timeline granted to several Member States is likely a 
compromise struck in the directive’s drafting, given the contentiousness of 
implementation discussed infra. 
 74 Eric Engle, Ecotaxes and the European Union, 16 EUR. ENERGY & ENVTL. 
L. REV. 298, 303 (2007). 
 75 Engle describes the problem of getting Member States to move forward on 
changing their taxation policies as an eco-tax version of the prisoners’ dilemma, 
everyone would benefit if action were taken, but no one wants to risk moving 
first, having other countries renege, and thus placing their industries at a 
competitive disadvantage. Id. 
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 b.     Emissions Trading for the Power Sector and Electricity-
 Heavy Industries 
Traditionally, the EU has left industrial energy efficiency 
policy to the Member States, largely because Member States have 
had success in negotiating long-term agreements with major 
national industries for voluntary energy efficiency improvements 
and in creating energy audit programs.76  However, more recently 
the EU implemented a major new law that creates a cap-and-trade 
scheme for greenhouse gas emissions from several EU industrial 
sectors, including electricity, metal processing, cement, glass, 
ceramics, pulp, paper, and board.77  This EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) covers about 46 percent of total EU CO2 emissions 
by imposing emissions caps on around twelve thousand industrial 
installations (i.e., facilities).78 While not primarily focusing on 
energy efficiency, the scheme should encourage energy efficiency 
improvements indirectly by making it more expensive to emit CO2 
and therefore more expensive to consume energy. However, some 
experts are skeptical of the impact that the EU ETS will have on 
energy efficiency improvements, arguing that the indirect incentive 
created is likely to be only minor given the design of the scheme.79 
7. Complementary Actions Towards Implementation 
The EU is not reliant on regulation alone to achieve further 
energy efficiency gains; it has a range of complementary tools to 
help achieve its goals.80  These tools include voluntary agreements 
with industry, provision of information to consumers, and a 
 
 76 PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., COMBINING LONG TERM AGREEMENTS WITH 
EMISSIONS TRADING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
POLICIES FOR THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INDUSTRIAL 
EFFICIENCY POLICY 1 (2007), available at http://www.energyagency.at/publ/pdf/ 
papier03.pdf. 
 77 Council Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading within the Community, art. 1, Annex I, 2003 O.J. 
(L 275) 32, 34, 42 (EC). Annex I of the Directive lists the exact industrial 
processes covered and specific exemptions available for small firms and 
experimental processes.  Id. at 42. 
 78 PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., WILL EMISSION TRADING PROMOTE END-USE 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS? ACEEE SUMMER 
STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN INDUSTRY 1 (2005), available at 
http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/pdf/publications/ACEEE%202005%2
0paper%2014%20final.pdf. 
 79 See, e.g., id. at 1–5. 
 80 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15. 
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Commission-run support program to help Member States achieve 
the ambitious goals the EU has set.81 
The Commission’s primary support program for helping 
Member States and regional authorities to implement energy 
efficiency programs and projects is Intelligent Energy-Europe 
(IEE). The program is now in its second phase and will run from 
2007 to 2013. IEE’s stated goal is to “speed up efforts to achieve 
the objectives in the field of sustainable energy.”82  To this end it 
funds a wide variety of projects that improve energy efficiency in 
buildings, industry, and appliances.83  The EU also has established 
a voluntary office equipment labeling program known as Energy 
Star, created through an agreement with the United States.  Under 
the program, office equipment manufacturers can apply to the 
Commission for an Energy Star logo to be placed on qualifying 
efficient office equipment.84  Similarly, the EU has run a 
successful GreenLight program since 2000 for voluntary actions in 
energy efficiency lighting.  There are currently around 190 
organizations participating in GreenLight, contributing a total 
savings of approximately 100 GWh/year through installing more 
energy-efficient lighting in their facilities.85 
These complementary measures are excellent in providing 
short-term solutions, often with significant participation, that help 
to fill the time lag in implementation of EU directives.86  However, 
the Commission reports that the track record on voluntary 
 
 81 See, e.g., Action Plan, supra note 30. 
 82 Europa, Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/n26104.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
 83 See generally Intelligent Energy Europe, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/index_en.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). 
Initiatives include more detailed projects (e.g. improving the energy performance 
of schools), and broader capacity-building projects at the Member State level. 
The most prominent example of this type of program is “Implementing EU 
Appliance Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” which helps to put EU energy 
efficiency policies into place in the newer EU states by training national experts, 
putting forth templates for national plans, and facilitating exchange of best 
practices. See Intelligent Energy Executive Agency, European Commission, 
Energy Efficient Equipment and Products 8 (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/library/doc/ka_reports/equipment.pdf. 
 84 Council Regulation 2422/2001, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 332) 1, 3 (EC). 
 85 Paolo Bertoldi & Calin Ciugudeanu, European Commission, Five-year 
Assessment of the European GreenLight Programme, 1, 6, available at 
http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/pdf/publications/RL6%20Paper%20Gr
eenLight%20final.pdf. 
 86 Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 141. 
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agreements is “patchy.”87  This patchiness suggests that while 
voluntary programs can act as excellent complements to energy 
efficiency laws, they are not a sufficient stand-alone solution, even 
in an environmentally conscious community like the EU. 
D. Success of Current Policies and Looking Ahead 
While the EU has improved and continues to improve its 
energy efficiency, it still faces certain difficulties in realizing its 
full potential for energy savings. Since 1990, the EU’s energy 
intensity (a measure of energy consumed per dollar of GDP 
generated) has steadily improved; however, it has not improved 
enough to counter the rise in GDP during the same period.88  The 
consequence is that final energy consumption has risen despite 
gains in energy efficiency.89  Improvements have also slowed in 
recent years compared to early years of policy implementation: 
whereas annual gains of 1.4 percent of energy consumed per dollar 
GDP were made in the early 1990s, by 2003 these gains had fallen 
to 0.5 percent per year.90  The reasons for this decrease in 
improvements include a decrease in energy prices and what has 
been termed the “rebound effect”—as energy becomes more 
efficient and therefore cheaper, people increase their demand as a 
consequence of the falling price, thereby eliminating some or all of 
the gains made in energy efficiency.91  More encouragingly, 
‘negajoules,’ a measure of the energy saved from energy efficiency 
measures, now represent the EU’s single most important energy 
resource (calculated by projecting 1971 energy intensity onto 
current economic output to reflect what total consumption might 
have been absent efficiency improvements).92  Figure 1 compares 
negajoules with other major energy sources.93 
 
 87 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15. 
 88 Draft Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the 
Potential, EUR. PARL. DOC. (INI 2106) 10 (2007) (Provisional), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/pr/670/670363/
670363en.pdf. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 11. 
 91 HOWARD GELLER & SOPHIE ATTALI, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE 
EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES IN IEA 
COUNTRIES 5 (Aug. 2005). 
 92 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 11. Essentially, a negajoule represents 
energy not consumed because of enhanced energy efficiency. Thus, ‘negajoules’ 
measure not actual sources of energy, but rather what projected energy 
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Figure 1. Development of primary energy demand and of “negajoules” in the EU-25 
 
Evaluating the success of any particular energy efficiency 
policy is difficult, as gains in efficiency are often inspired by 
overlapping policies and incentives at the EU and Member State 
levels. Clearly, the broad scope of the EU’s efficiency regulations 
helps contribute to their effectiveness. The International Energy 
Agency estimated that around 32 percent of current EU electricity 
consumption was covered by some type of mandatory energy 
efficiency policy as of August 2007, and that planned policies 
would raise the coverage to around 62 percent.94  Labeling and 
mandatory emissions standards were found to be one of the most 
cost-effective methods to meet energy demand.95 
While the accomplishments of EU energy efficiency policy to 
date deserve praise, politicians and policy-makers throughout 
Europe recognize that there is much more to be done on energy 
efficiency.  The European Commission has recently published a 
Green Paper on Energy Efficiency and an Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan for the years 2007–2012.96  The Green Paper serves as 
a scoping paper in which the Commission identifies issues and 
 
consumption would have been absent investments in energy efficiency. Put 
differently, negajoules are a measure of the amount of energy supply the EU 
would have needed to construct had energy efficiency measures not been 
implemented. 
 93 Id. 
 94 MARK ELLIS, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, EXPERIENCE WITH ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY REGULATIONS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 10 (Aug. 2007). 
 95 Id. at 20. 
 96 Action Plan, supra note 30; Green Paper, supra note 5. 
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solicits feedback, and the Action Plan lays out concrete 
Commission priorities in energy efficiency policy for six years.  
This Action Plan for 2007–2012 is actually the second Action Plan 
for Energy Efficiency; the first plan expired in 2006. 
In some ways, there is as much to learn from these planned 
priorities as there is from past energy efficiency policy actions. 
The Action Plan highlights those areas where past EU energy 
efficiency policy has fallen short of expectations and needs further 
policy intervention.  Even after fifteen years of steadily increasing 
energy efficiency policy, the EU calculates that it can save a 
further 20 percent of current energy consumption in a cost-
effective manner, amounting to savings equal to the combined 
current energy consumption of Germany and Finland (around 390 
million Mtoe) and saving the EU sixty billion euros per year.97 
Briefly, some of the key challenges still remaining for the EU 
to face on energy efficiency are presented below along with the 
solutions proposed in the Commission’s Green Paper and Action 
Plan: 
 
1. Challenge: There is a lack of training to create experts and 
keep them apprised of the latest energy efficiency 
technologies.98 
Proposed Solutions: The EU needs to develop a well-
trained network of energy efficiency experts and service 
providers.99 Energy efficiency training should be included 
in vocational training in order to overcome the current 
shortage of skilled personnel in the field.100 
2. Challenge: Energy efficiency project developers lack 
access to adequate financial instruments to fund their 
projects. Banks are often reluctant to undertake the 
financing of energy efficiency projects, often due to a lack 
of technical knowledge, despite the fact that the projects 
generally have reliable paybacks.101 
Proposed Solutions: The EU should explore the use of 
“global loans,” or funds redistributed from banks through a 
 
 97 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 5. 
 98 Id. at 12. 
 99 Id. at 14. 
 100 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15. 
 101 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 12. 
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clearinghouse that has some technical and economical 
expertise in energy efficiency investments.102 Energy 
Service Companies also have a major role to play in 
financing energy efficiency improvements and these 
companies need more policy support for their activities.103 
The EU should work to create further EU-wide financing 
mechanisms for energy efficiency, possibly through the 
European Investment Bank or the European Regional 
Development Fund.104 
3. Challenge: Taxes and the current pricing system for 
energy do not reflect the consequences of energy 
consumption well enough.105 
Proposed Solutions: Real-time metering should be 
explored as a method to more accurately link energy prices 
and full costs of supply.106 At the Community level, there 
should be more harmonization of energy tax regimes and 
better targeted state aid that helps in energy efficiency 
financing.107 The Commission will publish a Green Paper 
that examines how indirect taxation could be used to 
incentivize energy efficiency.108 
4. Challenge: More needs to be done to harness market 
forces for energy efficiency to overcome the disincentive 
barriers that suppliers typically face, whereby expanding 
energy efficiency measures lowers profits.  (When the 
supplier sells less energy due to increases in efficiency, 
profits decline because they are traditionally reflective of 
the total amount of energy sold.) 
Proposed Solution: The Commission will consider 
implementing an EU-wide white certificate system that 
would incentivize investment in energy efficiency by 
energy suppliers. The scheme would mirror those already 
used by Italy and the United Kingdom, requiring suppliers 
 
 102 Id. It will be interesting to see how recommendations for expanding capital 
available for energy efficiency will fare in the much tighter global economy that 
exists today as compared with when the Commission drafted its Action Plan. 
 103 Id. at 13. These financing issues are discussed more in depth infra Part IV. 
 104 Id. at 18. 
 105 Id. at 13–14. 
 106 Id. at 14. 
 107 Id. at 17–18. 
 108 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 17. 
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and distributors of electricity to undertake a certain amount 
of energy efficiency improvement measures for their final 
users or purchase certificates from other suppliers, EU-
wide, that could make such improvements more 
economically.109 
5. Challenge: The energy transformation sector is still highly 
inefficient—transformation losses currently account for 33 
percent of primary EU energy consumption.110 
Proposed Solutions: The Commission plans to develop 
minimum binding efficiency requirements for new 
electricity, heating, and cooling generation units under 
twenty MW in size (those not covered by the EU ETS).111 
The Commission also plans to propose a new regulatory 
framework to promote the connection of decentralized 
generation,112 which will reduce transformation losses by 
locating electricity sources closer to consumers. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY LAWS AND POLICY 
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of EU energy 
efficiency policy given the breadth and depth of its laws and 
complementary programs, but as one commentator has aptly put it, 
“[r]egulations, however tough, are likely to mean little if Member 
States continually fail to implement them.”113 The EU has had a 
 
 109 Green Paper, supra note 5, at 25. For a fuller explanation of white 
certificates, see infra Part IV(B). These white certificates are roughly analogous 
to the renewable energy credits (RECs) being used by many U.S. states to 
measure compliance with mandatory renewable energy policies. RECs are 
awarded to renewable energy generators and are then purchased by utilities as 
proof of compliance with state-level legal obligations to supply a certain 
percentage of their electricity from renewable sources. The critical advantage of 
using RECs or white certificates is that they can significantly lower compliance 
costs for utilities that have to meet certain targets. Costs are lowered by allowing 
any utility to simply purchase RECs/certificates from a different supplier, if 
another entity can produce renewable energy or energy efficiency improvements 
more cheaply. This system also creates a fair, competitive market that equalizes 
compliance costs across different geographic or market areas. See, e.g., RYAN 
WISER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARDS: A FACTUAL INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIENCE FROM THE UNITED 
STATES 3–4 (2007). 
 110 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 13. 
 111 Id. at 14. 
 112 Id. 
 113 PAUL K. LYONS, EU ENERGY POLICIES TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 70 
(1998). 
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mixed experience with implementation of its energy efficiency 
laws: while much progress has been made in improving energy 
efficiency across the major sectors, Member States are far from 
achieving complete implementation of EU-level laws.  The key 
implementation challenge is how to induce Member States to 
undertake the actions imposed on them at the EU level.  The main 
mechanism for compelling implementation is the design of the 
directives themselves, coupled with the enforcement mechanisms 
that will be discussed infra Part III.  This section focuses on some 
of the key strategies contained within EU-level energy efficiency 
laws to prompt implementation of the directives at the EU and 
Member State level.  While it draws from specific directives for 
examples, its primary goal is to highlight the general regulatory 
tools that EU law uses to encourage, cajole, and enforce 
implementation of its energy efficiency directives.114 
A. Commission Responsibilities 
One strategy the EU uses to achieve implementation is to write 
concrete responsibilities for the Commission directly into the 
energy efficiency laws. Namely, the Commission must create 
“daughter directives” for some programs, and bears reporting 
requirements for almost every program. In particular, the Labeling 
Directive and the Eco-Design Directive do not themselves create 
specific product standards, but rather require the Commission to 
adopt further directives regulating specific products.115  In general, 
the Commission appears to achieve full implementation of its tasks 
with little enforcement effort; however, delays do occur, 
particularly in the implementation of some of its more ambitious 
 
 114 This paper constrains its scope to the implementation of EU energy 
efficiency laws; however, there is a second level at which energy efficiency 
legislation is passed outside of this Community framework, with some Member 
States choosing to independently pursue energy efficiency laws that exceed the 
scope and often the effectiveness of EU energy efficiency laws. For example, in 
its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency, the United Kingdom reports that 
based on its domestic energy efficiency laws, it expects to double the EU-wide 
end-use efficiency target of 9 percent by 2016, reaching an 18 percent 
improvement in energy efficiency by 2016. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND 
RURAL AFFAIRS, UK ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION PLAN, PB 12615, 13 (2007), 
available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/energy 
/pdf/action-plan-2007.pdf. 
 115 See Eco-Design Directive, supra note 65, art. 15, at 39–41; Labeling 
Directive, supra note 50, arts. 10–12, at 18–19. 
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timelines.116  The fact that the Commission publishes such 
timelines, however, gives Parliament and the Council the ability to 
monitor the Commission’s progress and make public any lapses in 
implementation—a ‘shaming’ strategy to prompt the Commission 
into quicker action.117 
B. Member State Implementation 
As discussed supra section I(B), the implementation of EU 
laws follows the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that overall 
objectives are set at the EU level through directives, and 
responsibility for implementation falls heavily upon the Member 
States.  The energy efficiency directives vary in the discrete 
implementation tasks that they require of the Member States, but 
there are some identifiable common methodologies that the energy 
efficiency laws use to encourage full implementation at the 
Member State level.  This section identifies these common 
methodologies that serve as strategies to ensure implementation 
and provides examples of these methods in specific directives. 
1. Transposition to National Law 
Each energy efficiency directive has a provision for 
transposition, whereby the Member States are required to bring 
into force the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with the directive.118  Each provides a date by 
which full transposition must occur and requires Member States to 
communicate the adoption of domestic laws fulfilling each 
directive’s requirements to the Commission,119 thus enabling easy 
tracking of Member States’ compliance status. 
 
 116 For example, the Commission has been behind its originally announced 
schedule in implementing products standards under the Eco-design Directive. 
See infra Part I(C)(5). 
 117 Notably, the Commission’s lag in implementing the Eco-design Directive 
has not gone unnoticed. Parliament recently tried to shame them into faster 
implementation, deploring “the severe slippage in the timetable for the adoption 
of minimum energy performance standards for priority product groups.” Draft 
Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential, supra 
note 88, at 5. 
 118 See, e.g., Buildings Directive, supra note 24, art. 15, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 69; 
Labeling Directive, supra note 50, art. 14, at 19. 
 119 See, e.g., Labeling Directive, supra note 50, art. 14, at 19. 
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2. National Implementing Authorities 
In general, the directives leave the choice of implementing 
authority to the Member States, but they may enumerate some 
specific powers that the implementing authority must be granted. 
For example, in the case of the Eco-Design Directive, Member 
States may choose an authority responsible for market 
surveillance, but they must ensure that whatever ministry, 
department, agency, or other body chosen is empowered to 
monitor compliance and order recalls of non-compliant 
products.120 Similarly, the Cogeneration Directive calls for 
Member States to designate a competent body to implement an 
accurate and reliable guarantee of origin system to certify that 
energy was produced using cogeneration.121 
3. Targets, Methodologies, and Performance Standards 
Some of the more concrete obligations placed upon Member 
States in many of the energy efficiency directives are the creation 
of targets, methodologies for objectively measuring progress of 
various actors, and performance standards. For example, the End-
Use Energy Efficiency Directive requires each Member State to 
submit an Energy Efficiency Action Plan that sets an overall 
national target that will achieve 9 percent savings in nine years, 
sets an interim target to be established within three years, and 
provides “an overview of its strategy for achievement of the 
intermediate and overall targets.”122  Further action plans, which 
must evaluate progress towards the national target and include 
plans for additional measures necessary to meet the targets, are due 
after four and seven years.123 The Buildings Directive, while 
honoring subsidiarity by recognizing that regional differences may 
create a need for varying methodologies, calls for each Member 
State to create and apply a methodology at the national or regional 
level for calculating the energy performance of buildings.124 
Member States must also set minimum energy performance 
requirements for buildings.125  Requiring targets, methodologies, 
 
 120 Eco-Design Directive, supra note 65, art. 3, at 35–36. 
 121 Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 5, at 54. 
 122 End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 4, at 69. 
 123 Id. art. 14, at 72–73. 
 124 Buildings Directive, supra note 24, art. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67. 
 125 Id. art. 4, 2003 O.J. (L 1) at 67–68. 
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and Action Plans at least ensures that Member States are devoting 
resources and staff to addressing the directive’s aims, though it 
does not ensure full achievement of these aims. 
4. Public Sector Leadership 
Given that the EU’s public sector accounts for 5 to 10 percent 
of total EU energy consumption, public sector obligations can 
make a sizeable dent in cutting overall energy demand.126  Because 
public sector obligations are imposed directly on Member State 
governments, such obligations are also easier to monitor than 
obligations imposed through Member States on private parties. 
Thus, public sector requirements are directly imposed in the End-
Use Energy Efficiency Directive, which generally requires that 
“Member States shall ensure that the public sector fulfils an 
exemplary role in the context of this Directive.”127  It goes on to 
concretize this obligation by requiring the passage of public 
procurement legislation that includes at least two EU-specified 
measures.128 
5. Reporting Requirements 
Many of the energy efficiency directives also contain reporting 
requirements for Member States to make periodic assessments of 
their implementation progress. The goals of these reporting 
provisions seem to be to encourage information production and to 
force at least some action by requiring comprehensive planning 
and periodic progress reports, on the assumption that Member 
States are unlikely to be willing to report zero progress towards 
national goals.  For example, while the Cogeneration Directive 
does not go so far as to set national targets, it does require that 
each Member State take the first step of establishing a national 
goal for how much cogeneration it plans to achieve, and then 
requires periodic reports (every four years) on progress towards 
increasing the share of high-efficiency cogeneration.129  In addition 
to requiring each Member State to engage in at least a minimum 
amount of national energy efficiency planning, periodic reports are 
 
 126 Bruggeman, supra note 28, at 147. 
 127 End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 5, at 69. 
 128 Id. Member States must choose two activities from a list of EU-approved 
activities that is attached to the Directive as an appendix.  Id. 
 129 Cogeneration Directive, supra note 56, art. 6, at 54. 
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also useful to the Commission as an easy tool by which to track 
implementation progress. 
C. Implementation: Progress and Challenges 
Overall, these implementation strategies are somewhat, but not 
fully, effective at inducing Member States to adopt into national 
law and execute on a national level the full goals of the EU energy 
efficiency directives. The level of implementation varies from 
Member State to Member State and from directive to directive, but 
more could and should be done to induce better implementation. 
One expert has called the Member States’ approach to 
implementing EU environmental law “low key and minimalist,” 
finding that “in practice, Member States have not been particularly 
diligent to ensure that relevant law and practice is aligned with the 
environmental obligations entered into by them at EU level.”130 
The Commission also recognizes the gap in implementation, 
calling for Member States to “go further on implementing and 
realizing the full potential of current legislation” and to make “full 
use of local and regional Energy Agencies.”131 
One of the primary concerns that continues to plague the EU in 
implementation of energy efficiency laws is the large divergence 
in energy-savings potential and implementation capacity among 
countries. Average energy intensity is 60 percent higher in 
Southeastern Europe than in Western Europe,132 and the 
Southeastern countries lag behind in the development of national 
energy policy and particularly in implementing cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures.133  One report estimates that efficiency 
investments could economically save 30 to 50 percent of energy 
consumption in Southeastern Europe.134  The fundamental problem 
in many of these countries is a lack of sufficient resources 
dedicated to energy efficiency to meet the EU objectives.  By way 
of illustration, the Czech Energy Agency, responsible for 
implementing all energy efficiency measures, has a staff of twenty 
 
 130 MARTIN HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LEGAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 5 (2007). 
 131 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6. 
 132 Emmanuel Bergasse, What Energy Policy for South East Europe?, PUB. 
SERVICE REV.: EUR. UNION, Spring 2003, at 34. 
 133 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN ECONOMIES IN 
TRANSITION: A POLICY PRIORITY 1 (Dec. 2004). 
 134 Id. 
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and an annual budget of only three million euros; Poland’s 
National Energy Conservation Agency has a staff of fewer than 
twenty.135 In contrast, the Netherlands Agency for Energy and 
Environment has a staff of over 500 and a budget of more than 300 
million euros (60 percent of which goes to energy).136 
Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy 
recently lambasted the progress in the implementation of energy 
efficiency legislation in its comments on the new Energy 
Efficiency Action Plan: “[f]or the current Action Plan to work, 
previous legislation needs to have been implemented effectively. 
Nothing could be further from the case.”137  In particular, it found 
that the Buildings Directive had been properly transposed by only 
five of twenty-five Member States.138  Ten different contributors to 
the Debate on the Green Paper for Energy Efficiency commented 
that implementation of the Buildings Directive was difficult 
because of a lack of expertise in designing and building;139 this 
suggests a need for building more competency and capacity in this 
area, rather than a lack of will to implement.  In contrast, there are 
reports that the implementation of the labeling directive, which is 
less technically complex, has gone extremely well and saved the 
EU twenty-four to thirty terawatt-hours140 of energy consumption 
since 1995.141 Savings through 2010 are expected to approximately 
double.142 
 
 135 Id. at 2. 
 136 Id. at 2. This divergence is not explained by the countries’ relative sizes: 
the Czech Republic’s population is roughly 10.2 million; the Netherlands’, 16.6 
million.  See U.S. Census Bureau, International Database, Country Summaries, 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/summaries.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2009). 
 137 Draft Report on an Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the 
Potential, supra note 88, at 11. 
 138 Id. at 5. 
 139 Analysis of the Debate of the Green Paper on Energy Efficiency, supra 
note 54, Annex I, at 37. 
 140 Twenty-four to thirty terawatt-hours is 24,000,000–30,000,000 MWh. For 
reference, a MWh is the equivalent of powering approximately 750 households 
for one hour. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEP’T OF ENERGY: KEY 
CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING ADVANCED ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGIES TO MEET FUTURE NEEDS 2 (2006). 
 141 Paolo Bertoldi & Bogdan Atanasiu, Inst. for Env’t & Sustainability, 
European Commission, Electricity Consumption and Efficiency Trends in the 
Enlarged European Union—Status Report 2006, 55, EUR 22753 (2007). 
 142 Id. 
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Intrinsically tied to the issue of implementation is that of 
enforcement—strong enforcement, or a perception that laws will 
be stringently enforced, creates more compliance. The EU lacks 
the power to directly legislate that the Member States devote more 
resources or expertise to energy efficiency, but it does have some 
enforcement capabilities that it exercises with regularity in an 
attempt to obtain greater implementation of the energy efficiency 
laws. This enforcement power is the subject of the next section. 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
Given the EU’s structure,143 three levels of potential 
enforcement authority exist: the EU level, the Member State level, 
and the individual level (in national court). In practice, EU energy 
efficiency law enforcement is dominated by the EU level. This 
section details the procedure by which the EU enforces its energy 
efficiency laws, discusses recent and current enforcement actions, 
and explores the potential for expanding enforcement capabilities 
to the other levels of enforcement authority in order to increase 
effectiveness. 
A. EU Enforcement Procedure 
EU law clearly places an obligation on Member States to 
comply with all obligations contained in EU directives.144 In 
theory, the Member States should play “a seminal role in the 
enforcement area, bearing legal obligations under EU law to 
ensure that the Union’s environmental protection legislation is 
properly implemented within their respective territories and within 
the deadlines foreseen.”145 In practice, Member States are not 
particularly diligent in ensuring the adoption and enforcement of 
all EU laws.146  Fortunately, given this lack of enforcement action 
at the Member State level, the EC Treaty gives the Commission 
the authority to investigate and, if necessary, bring before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) any Member State that it believes 
has failed to fulfill its EU obligations.147 
 
 143 See supra Part I(A). 
 144 EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 10, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 42. 
 145 HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 5. 
 146 Id. 
 147 EC Treaty, supra note 19, art. 226, 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 125. 
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Commission enforcement action against a Member State 
involves two stages: the administrative stage and the judicial 
stage.148 At the administrative stage, enforcement typically begins 
as a dialogue whereby the Commission attempts to remedy 
breaches informally through consultation and negotiation with 
non-compliant Member States.149  If informal negotiations fail, the 
Commission issues a Letter of Formal Notice, which defines the 
breach it believes the Member State to have committed and 
requests compliance within a certain time frame.150  If the breach is 
not remedied by the deadline, the Commission then issues a 
“reasoned opinion” that sets out the legal arguments for how the 
Member State has violated EU law, and allows it reasonable time 
to remedy its breach.151 
After this deadline, the Commission can commence the 
judicial stage of enforcement through bringing action at the ECJ. If 
a judgment is won and a Member State still refuses to comply, the 
Commission can return to the ECJ and receive permission to levy 
fines against the Member State.152 However, few enforcement 
proceedings ever reach the judicial stage.153  One reason for the 
success of the administrative stage is that when disputes do reach 
this stage, ECJ judgments favor Member States over the 
Commission in only one in ten cases, and costs are assessed to 
Member States when they lose.154  This track record creates a 
strong incentive for cooperation with the Commission before 
reaching the judicial stage. 
The Commission can undertake the procedure described above 
to remedy two different types of breaches: non-transposition and 
bad application.155  Non-transposition exists when a Member State 
fails to adopt national legislation that incorporates an EU Directive 
within the deadline set by the directive.156 Bad application is where 
 
 148 DAVIES, supra note 11, at 89–90. 
 149 Id. at 39. 
 150 Id. at 89–90. 
 151 Id. at 90. 
 152 HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 31. 
 153 Id. 
 154 DAVIES, supra note 11, at 90. See also, e.g., Case C-342/07, Comm’n v. 
Hellenic Republic, 2007 O.J. (C 211) 58, (ordering Greece to pay costs upon a 
finding that it did not properly transpose the Buildings Directive). 
 155 HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 40–42. 
 156 Id. at 41. 
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a Member State has the appropriate laws in place but fails to 
ensure that these laws are being implemented in practice.157 Most 
often, the Commission focuses on enforcement of non-
transposition simply because this is far easier to detect, given that 
Member States are required to report back to the Commission 
when they have passed the legislation necessary to transpose a 
directive.158 Similarly, the Commission often focuses on 
“horizontal bad application,” where a number of Member States 
have failed to follow through on a specific commitment under a 
law, again usually detectable because of specific timetables for 
action set forth in a directive.159  Because the Commission has very 
limited investigatory powers, it is difficult for it to detect single 
cases of bad application, and it is heavily reliant on complaints 
from the public or non-governmental organizations in those 
situations where it does bring a case for individual bad 
application.160 
B. Enforcement of Energy Efficiency Laws 
The Commission has been active in its enforcement of energy 
efficiency laws in recent years.161  In the past three years, it has 
sent around forty-five Reasoned Opinions and Letters of Formal 
Notice.162 Table 2 details those enforcement proceedings 
undertaken by the Commission since December 2005.  During the 
 
 157 Id. at 41–42. 
 158 Id. at 41, 43. 
 159 Id. at 42. 
 160 Id. at 43. 
 161 It is difficult to know the exact complaints that the Commission has had 
against Member States in particular enforcement actions, as the Commission 
does not publish Letters of Formal Notice or Reasoned Opinions, judging them 
to be confidential litigation documents.  Id. at 196–97. However, the 
Commission does publish press releases outlining the formal enforcement 
actions that it is undertaking.  Id. 
 162 This number was obtained by searching EU press releases in the field of 
energy from December 2005 through October 2008 for news of enforcement 
actions, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do. (To obtain the same 
search results, input “IP-EC Press Release” into the “Type” field, the date range 
specified into the “Date Range” field, and “Energy” into the “Queries” option 
under the “Optional Search Criteria” field, and then manually search through 
results for press releases relating to the Commission taking legal action against 
Member States or issuing reasoned opinions against Member States.) 
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same period of time, only four cases have been referred to the 
European Court of Justice; Table 3 shows these cases.163 
The high number of administrative enforcement actions taken, 
coupled with the low number of cases actually referred to the 
European Court of Justice, suggests that the Commission is quite 
successful at enforcing implementation of EU law through its more 
informal administrative channels. It is noteworthy, however, that 
all of the recent enforcement actions have been for failure to notify 
the Commission of transposition or failure to submit National 
Energy Efficiency Action Plans by the deadline. Thus, the 
Commission has focused its efforts on enforcing the first stage of 
EU law implementation—simply having the laws transposed into 
Member State law and incorporated into national planning 
activities.  The Commission’s enforcement actions do not indicate 
whether laws that are transposed by Member States are being 
effectively implemented on the ground. Given that the 
Commission brought 622 infringement cases in the field of energy 
and transport in 2005 alone,164 it is unsurprising that it was able to 
focus on only those more egregious violations of non-transposition 
and not the more fact-specific instances of bad application. This 
inability to ensure quality application of transposed laws is an 
important shortcoming of EU-level energy efficiency law 
enforcement and EU environmental law enforcement in general.165 
It is discussed further in the following section in relation to 
possible solutions. 
 
 163 This number was obtained by searching the judgments of the ECJ in the 
field of energy for cases from December 2005 through October 2008, and then 
manually sorting through results to find those cases related to the energy 
efficiency directives, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/ 
form.pl?lang=en. 
 164 23rd Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, 
EUR. PARL. DOC. (INI 2271) 9 (2005), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0416:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 165 See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 43. 
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TABLE 2. FORMAL ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TAKEN 
BY THE COMMISSION IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
DECEMBER 2005–OCTOBER 2008166 
 
Date Country Action Directive Reason 





















































































Failure to notify 
of sufficient 
 
 166 This table’s information was obtained from http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
searchAction.do; see supra note 162 for full explanation. 
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TABLE 3. COMMISSION REFERRALS TO EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
 DECEMBER 2005–OCTOBER 2008167 
 
Date Case Number Defendant Cause Holding 
May-08 C-187/08 Belgium Failure to adopt or notify 
of adequate national 
implementing measures 
to comply with Buildings 
Directive 
Pending 
July-07 C-342/07 Greece  Failure to adopt or notify 
of adequate laws, 
regulations, and 
administrative provisions 




Sept.-06 C-388/06 France  Failure to adopt laws 
under Taxation of Energy 




Sept.-05 C-360/05 Italy  Failure to adopt laws 
under Taxation of Energy 





C. Potential for Expanding Enforcement 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section on 
enforcement, enforcement of EU laws actually occurs on three 
levels: the EU level, the Member State level, and the individual 
level. Given that “the state of political and financial resources 
invested in EC environmental law enforcement at [the] national 
level leaves a lot to be desired,”168 and the fact that the 
Commission reports that it lacks the resources necessary to ensure 
full enforcement in the field of energy efficiency,169 private 
enforcement actions and citizen suits present a possible but under-
utilized third avenue of enforcement.  In particular, an expansion 
 
 167 This table’s information was obtained from http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
searchAction.do; see supra note 163 for full explanation. 
 168 See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 159. 
 169 The Commission estimates that it would need twenty more officials to 
ensure full implementation of its new Energy Efficiency Action Plan. Working 
Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 8 n.13. 
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of the EU concept of “direct effect,” explained below, might allow 
for significant improvements in enforcement of EU laws. 
There are fundamental reasons why the Commission should 
not be the primary entity responsible for EU energy efficiency law 
enforcement, even aside from resource and personnel constraints. 
A centralized model of law enforcement has inherent limits, 
because a central authority will never practically be able to make 
systematic checks on compliance throughout the Union.170 This 
makes the EU overly reliant on Member States to supply 
information on suspected violations of EU law, obviously creating 
a conflict of interest for Member States who are themselves liable 
for failing to implement EU laws.171 For this reason, the 
Commission makes the plea that “Member States should give the 
regional and local authorities to which they entrust (a part of) the 
enforcement on the ground of EU or national regulatory measures 
the necessary financial and human resources to carry this out in an 
effective manner.”172 Other possibilities are to integrate more 
investigatory powers into the Commission, or to give these powers 
to another entity to which individual citizens could report 
suspected violations;173 these reforms, however, still run into some 
of the inherent challenges of choosing a centralized enforcement 
framework. 
Recognizing these difficulties, the European Court of Justice 
has been expanding the notion of “direct effect.” Direct effect 
allows individuals to sue their Member States, in their national 
courts, under rights and obligations created by EU law. This area 
of law still has somewhat murky parameters—it is unclear what 
directives are to be given direct effect such that individuals can 
seek a remedy in national court.174 However, the ECJ has 
recognized that those directives that create concrete obligations on 
Member States should be enforceable against the States by their 
citizens.175 The critical test for whether a particular directive can 
be enforced by individuals is “whether the nature, background and 
wording of the provision in question are capable of producing 
 
 170 HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 162. 
 171 Id. at 162–64. 
 172 Working Document for Action Plan, supra note 3, at 14. 
 173 See HEDEMANN-ROBINSON, supra note 130, at 162–63. 
 174 Id. at 221–23. 
 175 Case 9/70: Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, 838. 
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direct effects in the legal relationships between the addressee of 
the act and third parties.”176 In the case of energy efficiency laws, 
no directive clearly states that it intends for individuals to have 
direct enforcement rights of Member State obligations; thus, it is 
an open question whether direct effect could be applicable to any 
energy efficiency laws. 
Given the Commission’s recognition that it is under-equipped 
to deal fully with enforcing energy efficiency laws, it might 
consider whether writing in more provisions capable of direct 
effect is a politically feasible option. Writing energy efficiency 
directives capable of direct effect would allow EU citizens to act 
as a second enforcement arm much closer to the on-the-ground 
implementation of energy efficiency laws by Member States than 
the Commission can practicably be. 
For now, granting direct effect remains only a possibility for 
achieving fuller enforcement of energy efficiency laws. In the 
meantime, the Commission appears to be diligently pursuing 
transposition of EU energy efficiency laws and, by quickly 
bringing enforcement actions against overdue Member States, has 
established that National Energy Efficiency Action Plans should be 
taken seriously. Beyond these obvious EU law violations, the 
Commission does not act as a police agent to enforce 
implementation on the ground, leaving this task to Member States, 
who diverge greatly in their enforcement capabilities. While this 
makes tracking full and effective implementation of energy 
efficiency laws difficult, it also conforms to the principle of 
subsidiarity underlying the EU’s governmental structure. 
IV. FUNDING AND FINANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
One of the major hurdles confronting energy efficiency 
projects is that although projects are cost-effective over time, they 
require the bulk of funding at their initial stages.177  The financial 
sector is often reluctant to finance energy efficiency projects, given 
 
 176 Id. at 837. For example, in the case cited, the ECJ held that a directive 
aimed at creating a common system of value-added taxes by a specific date could 
be enforced by a private citizen to challenge the taxes levied upon him by his 
Member State. Id. at 825. 
 177 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, SCALING UP ENERGY EFFICIENCY: BRIDGING THE 
ACTION GAP BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (2007), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/work/2007/scalingup/background.pdf. 
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their high up-front costs and long payback periods, the small 
investments called for by most projects, and a lack of expertise in 
financing energy efficiency.178  These barriers persist in spite of 
the fact that energy efficiency projects are typically characterized 
as low risk and as having good cash flow.179 
Recognizing these financial challenges, the EU has developed 
a number of funding mechanisms that help energy efficiency 
projects overcome their financial hurdles. Yet, even after more 
than a decade of experience, the EU still struggles with financing 
as one of the largest barriers to more energy efficiency efforts.180 
The major strategies used to date to fund energy efficiency can be 
loosely grouped into public funding, market-based instruments, 
and supporting private financing; experience with each is briefly 
discussed below. 
A. Public Funding 
The EU allocates some funding directly from its budget into 
grants for energy efficiency projects, including around 730 million 
euros to the Intelligent Energy Europe project discussed supra Part 
I(C)(7) and another 430 million euros to an “eco-innovation” 
program as part of its Entrepreneurship and Innovation Program.181 
These funds are given directly to specific projects, often run by a 
conglomeration of government agencies, universities, and in some 
cases private organizations.182  The EU also allocates some funds 
to energy efficiency technological research through its Seventh 
Framework program for research and technological 
development.183 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE OF COMPANIES 
FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS, INVESTING IN BUILDING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.euroace.org/reports.htm (follow “Investing in Building Energy 
Efficiency in the Enlarged European Union” hyperlink). 
 180 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16. 
 181 Euractiv, Funding Energy Efficiency in the EU, July 10, 2007, 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/funding-energy-efficiency-eu/article-165378. 
 182 See, e.g., INTELLIGENT ENERGY EXECUTIVE AGENCY, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, MULTIPLYING SUCCESS IN BUILDINGS (2006) (describing all 
buildings projects sponsored by Intelligent Energy Europe through 2006), 
available at http://www.adene.pt/NR/rdonlyres/4F686BA0-0BE0-438C-8C0E-
1E52EDA12494/52/Multiplyingsuccessinbuildings21InnovativeProjectss.pdf. 
 183 Euractiv, supra note 181. The Seventh Framework program is the EU’s 
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The countries that are most in need of financial assistance for 
funding energy efficiency are the recently-added Member States, 
many of which are economies in transition (from central planning 
towards free market regimes) and typically have fewer national 
resources to devote to financing energy efficiency.184 The EU’s 
Phare185 program is set up specifically to help Central and Eastern 
European countries transition to EU participation, through 
strengthening public administration, promoting strong national 
legislation, and helping countries achieve EU integration.186 
The Phare program has helped to fund a number of innovative 
state mechanisms for energy efficiency financing. For example, 
Hungary has created an Energy Efficiency Co-financing Scheme, 
whereby energy efficiency projects receive loans that they repay 
from energy savings, with a grant from Phare used to cover the 
interest on the loans.187 Helping Member States to come up with 
these types of innovative financing mechanisms is a cost-effective 
method of dispensing EU funds in small amounts that make 
measurable impacts; this is particularly important given the small 
size of the EU budget (less than the budget of the UK alone).188 
A recent paper in Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 
suggested that the EU structural funds could play a much larger 
 
latest comprehensive plan for research, and brings together all research-related 
EU initiatives under a common program, with the overarching goals of growth, 
competitiveness, and employment. See Europa, Seventh Framework Programme: 
Understand, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/understand_en.html. The program 
provides grants to qualifying companies, organizations, research centers, 
universities, and individuals for research in established areas of interest. See 
Europa, Seventh Framework Programme: Who, http://cordis.europa.eu/ 
fp7/who_en.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2009). 
 184 KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, supra note 179, at 5. 
 185 The acronym Phare stands for “Poland and Hungary Assistance for the 
Restructuring of the Economy.” See European Parliament, Briefing No. 33, The 
Phare Program and the Enlargement of the European Union (Dec. 4, 1998), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/33a1_en.htm 
#summary. It has now expanded to provide assistance to fourteen Central and 
Eastern European Countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia in addition to Poland and 
Hungary. Id. at Annex, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ 
briefings/33a3_en.htm. 
 186 European Union, Phare Programme, http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/ 
en/lvb/e50004.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). 
 187 KLINCKENBERG CONSULTANTS, supra note 179, at 10. 
 188 Euractiv, supra note 181. 
WELTON.MACRO.DOC 8/16/2009  5:02:21 PM 
1462 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 17 
role in energy efficiency.189 These funds are the EU’s main 
instrument for supporting social and economic development and 
reducing inequalities among regions, and amount to between 33 
percent and 40 percent of the EU budget, by different estimates.190 
While structural funds are not currently used to finance energy 
efficiency, they could easily be oriented to this goal or energy 
efficiency could be required for all projects applying for support 
from the funds.191 The Energy Efficiency Action Plan pledges that 
the Commission will encourage the use of structural funds to 
“facilitate leveraging of private financing at national and local 
levels for energy efficiency.”192 
Of direct relevance to developing countries is the recent 
creation of a Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Fund (GEEREF). This fund is designed to help overcome 
investment barriers for sustainable energy in developing countries 
and emerging economies by establishing a private-public 
partnership for risk sharing and co-financing.193 The goal of the 
fund is to attract “patient” risk capital that has a long-term prospect 
of return on investment, mostly from banks and financial 
intermediaries.194 The fund will initially receive eighty million 
euros from the Commission between 2007 and 2010, and a 
primary goal will be to direct this funding to investments under ten 
million euros, which are often ignored by traditional investors.195 
The Commission officially launched the fund in March 2008,196 
but it remains to be seen how the fund will fare in attracting 
 
 189 See Dalia Streimikiene et al., Use of EU Structural Funds for Sustainable 
Energy Development in New EU Member States, 11 RENEWABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVIEWS 1167 (2005). 
 190 See id. at 1172; Euractiv, supra note 181. 
 191 See Streimikiene et al., supra note 189, at 1173–74. 
 192 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16. 
 193 European Commission, The Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy Fund (GEEREF): Key Elements of the European Commission Initiative, 
at 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/key_elements.pdf. 
 194 Id. at 2. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Press Release, New 80 Million Euro Fund to Boost Energy Efficiency and 
Renewables in the Fight Against Climate Change in Developing Countries 
(March 28, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases 
Action.do?reference=IP/08/473&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLa
nguage=en. 
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private investment in the midst of the global financial crisis that 
has developed in 2008. 
B. Market Based Instruments 
The EU is increasingly turning to market-based instruments to 
promote improvements in energy efficiency and environmental 
quality. Foremost among these is the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, discussed supra Part I(C)(6), which creates a market for 
carbon emissions allowances.  However, it is debatable how much 
of an incentive this program creates for energy efficiency 
improvements in particular.197  More specifically targeted to 
energy efficiency are the white certificates being used by Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and France.198  White certificate programs place 
an obligation upon energy suppliers to help their customers 
implement a certain amount of annual energy savings.199 Each 
successful energy efficiency project is awarded white certificates 
to represent energy saved, and each supplier must have enough 
white certificates (either through implementing projects or through 
buying certificates from other suppliers) at the end of each year to 
meet its annual energy savings obligation.200 The EU has 
expressed a serious interest in white certificates and will consider 
whether or not to adopt an EU-wide scheme in the coming 
years.201 The advantage of an EU-wide scheme is that a single 
market would be more efficient and liquid, eliminating price 
differences between countries and mitigating price fluctuations.202 
However, the general sentiment of experts both in and outside of 
the Commission at the current time seems to be that while white 
certificates are a promising option, further development and testing 
of such schemes needs to be done to ensure that they are both 
effective and cost-effective.203 
 
 197 See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 78, at 1–5. 
 198 EURO WHITECERT PROJECT, WHITE CERTIFICATES: CONCEPT AND MARKET 
EXPERIENCES 3 (2007), available at http://www.ewc.polimi.it/documents/ 
EWC_brochure.pdf. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See id.  For a comparison of white certificates with the more familiar U.S. 
renewable energy credits system, see supra note 109. 
 201 End-use Energy Directive, supra note 33, art. 4, at 69. 
 202 Euro WhiteCert Project, supra note 198, at 5. 
 203 PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., WHITE, GREEN, AND BROWN CERTIFICATES: HOW 
TO MAKE THE MOST OF THEM?, ECEEE 2005 SUMMER STUDY: WHAT WORKS 
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C. Supporting Private Financing 
The EU is also committed to helping engage more private 
financing in the energy efficiency sector.204 One quasi-private 
institution that the EU is turning towards for greater investment in 
energy efficiency is the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EIB 
is jointly owned by the Member States and is a self-financing 
institution that focuses its lending efforts based on policy 
priorities.205 In the energy field, energy efficiency is one of five 
priority areas that the EIB finances. In 2007, the EIB decided to 
raise the share of total costs that it will finance for energy 
efficiency projects from 50 percent to 75 percent,206 which makes 
 
AND WHO DELIVERS? 1515, 1525 (2005), available at http://www. 
ewc.polimi.it/dl.php?file=integration.pdf. In considering a white certificate 
scheme, questions are also raised over how a white certificates scheme might 
interact with EU climate change policy, and specifically the EU ETS. A 2005 
study found that current white certificates policies are unlikely to have a major 
impact on overall greenhouse gas emissions, given that utilities are covered by 
the EU ETS and would simply sell any credits saved from energy efficiency to 
other emitters. David Harrison, Jr. et al, European Commission Directorate 
General Environment, Interactions of the EU ETS with Green and White 
Certificate Schemes: A Summary for Policy Makers, at 20 (Nov. 17, 2005). 
However, white certificates could help lower overall emissions to the extent that 
they help lower household fuel consumption (a sector not covered by the EU 
ETS).  Id.  Moreover, the EU could decide to require utilities to retire annually a 
number of carbon allowances equal to the amount of carbon emissions avoided 
through the white certificates program (instead of allowing utilities to sell these 
allowances). This would ensure that white certificates contributed to additional 
greenhouse gas reductions on top of the EU ETS, but would raise the cost of the 
program as well. 
 204 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16. 
 205 Europa, The European Investment Bank, http://europa.eu/institutions/ 
financial/eib/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). The EIB is a unique 
institution: It “is a non-profit, policy driven bank. Unlike commercial banks, the 
EIB does not manage personal bank accounts, conduct over-the-counter 
transactions or provide private investment advice. The EIB makes long-term 
loans for capital investment projects (mainly fixed assets) but does not provide 
grants. The EIB is owned by the Member States of the European Union. They 
subscribe jointly to its capital, each country’s contribution reflecting its 
economic weight within the Union. The EIB does not use any funds from the EU 
budget. Instead, it is self-financing, borrowing on the financial markets. Because 
the EU Member States are the EIB’s shareholders, it carries the highest possible 
credit rating (AAA) on the money markets. As a result, the EIB can raise large 
amounts of capital on very competitive terms. As the EIB is not-for-profit, its 
lending conditions are equally favourable. . . . The projects the Bank invests in 
are carefully selected according to the following criteria: they must help achieve 
EU objectives; they must be economically, financially, technically and 
environmentally sound; they should help attract other sources of funding.” Id. 
 206 The European Investment Bank, Renewable Energies and Energy 
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these projects feasible for a wider range of potential investors. The 
current Energy Efficiency Action Plan commits the Commission to 
“call upon the banking sector to offer finance packages specifically 
aimed at small and medium enterprises,” specifically through more 
public-private partnerships between the private banking sector and 
the EIB.207 This goal will likely prove increasingly challenging as 
the EU struggles with how to manage a major credit crunch in late 
2008.208 
In addition, the Commission recognizes the important role that 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) can play in funding energy 
efficiency improvements. ESCOs help design, finance, and 
implement energy efficiency projects for energy users and then 
share in the energy savings achieved in order to recoup costs and 
earn a profit.209  Typical ESCO-run projects include replacement 
of inefficient heating and cooling equipment, re-designed lighting, 
improvement of industrial processes for energy savings, and 
installation of cogeneration.210 The Commission has long been 
promoting the ESCO industry,211 and it is expected that the End-
 
Efficiency, http://www.eib.org/projects/topics/environment/renewable-energy 
/index.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
 207 Action Plan, supra note 30, at 16. 
 208 See Managing the Credit Crunch: The European Union’s Week from Hell, 
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, at 69. 
 209 See PAOLO BERTOLDI & SILVIA REZESSY, ENERGY SERVICES COMPANIES IN 
EUROPE 17–18 (2005), available at http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/energyefficiency/ 
(click on hyperlink for “Publications” and a PDF version of the study is available 
under “Reports”). This report does an excellent job of explaining in detail the 
financing schemes that are successfully employed by ESCOs and the status of 
ESCO development in each Member State, and might prove a good reference if 
more specific information on ESCO structure and function is desired. A 2007 
update to the report is also available, with more detailed country summaries. See 
PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., LATEST DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY SERVICES 
COMPANIES ACROSS EUROPE (2007), available at http://www.energy.eu/ 
publications/LBNA22927ENC_002.pdf. 
 210 See Paolo Bertoldi, Silvia Rezessy & Edward Vine, Energy Service 
Companies in European Countries: Current Status and a Strategy to Foster 
Their Development, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1818, 1823–25 (2006). 
 211 Specific historical policies are outlined in BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra 
note 209, at 15: “The European Commission has long been promoting the ESCO 
industry and TPF” (third party financing) since it first recommended their 
promotion to Member States in 1988.  “In 1992, the European Council and 
Parliament adopted a Directive (93/76/EC), which invited Member States to 
design and implement programmes to use TPF in the public sector. Under the 
European Commission’s THERMIE and SAVE programs, several studies and 
pilot projects were implemented to promote ESCO and TPF activities, mainly in 
public buildings and combined heat and power (CHP). In 1996, two standard 
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Use Efficiency Directive will further its activities. Specifically, the 
directive is designed to facilitate and stimulate more investment in 
energy efficiency, and requires Member States to remove barriers 
to ESCOs212 and third party financing.213 
Unsurprisingly, major differences exist among Member States 
in the degree of development of their ESCO industries. On the 
whole, the ESCO industry was found to be “in its infancy stage 
and . . . struggling to get off the ground” as of 2005, except in 
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and France.214  Since then, major 
gains have been made in the development of the ESCO industry 
across Europe, and particularly in new Member States. But some 
countries still lag far behind.215  Major causes of these divergences 
include levels of support given by national and regional authorities 
and variations in market structures and rules.216  To promote 
further use of the ESCO industry across Europe, Commission 
experts came up with a number of policy recommendations in their 
2005 analysis: increasing dissemination of information about 
services offered by ESCOs; launching an accreditation system for 
ESCOs to ensure that companies calling themselves ESCOs are 
qualified and reliable; developing financing capabilities and 
incentives in local markets that allow ESCOs to get off the ground 
and become capable of providing their own working capital; 
 
ESCO-type contracts were published—for buildings and for industry—in all the 
languages of the EU. In 2002, the European Commission’s GreenLight Program 
identified ESCOs operating in the lighting field, and created a preliminary list of 
ESCOs . . . . More recently, in 2003, the European Commission DG JRC 
conducted a survey of ESCOs in the EU, resulting in the creation of the first 
online EU database of ESCOs.” 
 212 Some common barriers to ESCOs that exist in many Member States are 
low awareness and lack of understanding of ESCO services; administrative 
services including complicated procedures and high transaction costs, and high 
perceived risk and skepticism among ESCO clients (likely closely linked to the 
lack of awareness and understanding). See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 
85–86. 
 213 Third party financing is one way in which an ESCO finances energy 
efficiency improvements for its customers, by borrowing the necessary capital 
from a third party and paying it off gradually through the energy savings 
achieved. See generally Directorate-General for Energy & Transport, European 
Commission, Third Party Financing of Energy Efficiency in Industry, 
Structuring of Pilot Projects in Poland, Austria, Norway and Spain (Dec. 2000), 
available at http://www.energyagency.at/publ/pdf/tpfind_en.pdf. 
 214 BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 209, at 3. 
 215 See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 79. 
 216 BERTOLDI & REZESSY, supra note 209, at 3. 
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standardizing monitoring and verification of energy savings; 
promoting public sector use of ESCO services; and developing a 
third-party financing network throughout Europe that would bring 
together financial institutions, energy suppliers, and ESCOs to 
share best practices and coordinate the effort towards greater 
market penetration of ESCOs.217 
On the whole, the EU’s energy efficiency financing goals 
appear to be two-fold: better targeting of the limited public funding 
available to particularly needy and high-yielding projects, and 
better harnessing of private incentives as the more realistic source 
of most energy efficiency financing for the future. Given some of 
the continuing struggles of implementing and enforcing efficiency 
laws, pursuing financing as more of a “carrot” strategy as opposed 
to the more traditional “stick” strategy will be an important 
component of the overall success of energy efficiency 
improvements. Hopefully, as the EU works to update and 
strengthen its energy efficiency policy and to achieve its Action 
Plan, implementation, enforcement, and financing will all continue 
to improve. In the meantime, there are a number of lessons to be 
drawn from the EU’s experience to date. 
V. TRANSFERRING THE LESSONS FROM THE EU TO CHINA 
This final section of the note focuses on how the lessons 
learned from the EU’s experience in developing, implementing, 
and enforcing energy efficiency laws might be transferred to 
China.  This focus on implementation, enforcement, and financing 
is particularly critical in China, where the National People’s 
Congress has enacted seemingly strong energy efficiency laws that 
are in fact woefully under-implemented and under-enforced at the 
local level.218  While the differences between the EU and China in 
many respects seem staggering, especially as measured by their 
relative stages of economic development and environmental 
protection, their institutional structures are in some ways similar 
and offer an opportunity to export lessons learned from the EU to 
China.  The similarities and differences between the EU and China 
are highlighted in the first part of this section that focuses on 
 
 217 See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 57–60. 
 218 See, e.g., Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 227–28 (suggesting that a lack of 
implementation and enforcement is critical to the under-success of national 
energy efficiency laws). 
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Chinese laws and institutions. Subsequent subsections detail 
recommendations for how China might improve implementation, 
enforcement, and financing based on the lessons the EU has 
learned in these areas. 
A. Institutions and Law 
1. Institutions 
China is unhampered by some of the institutional barriers that 
stand in the way of the EU’s ability to formulate comprehensive 
energy laws because China is a single nation with power vested in 
the National People’s Congress to formulate all “fundamental” 
national legislation.219 Recall that the EU’s principle of 
subsidiarity constrains the EU from passing detailed, mandatory 
measures at the Union-level.  China’s ability to pass more specific 
commands at the central level could be a major advantage over the 
EU’s structure—centralized mandates may in many situations 
enhance oversight and create clearer objectives for local 
governments to implement. Nevertheless, in practice China’s 
central government has devolved much authority to the local level, 
placing these governments in primary control of interpreting and 
implementing what are often vague, largely aspirational national 
laws.220 Provincial governments, and a few municipal 
governments, are also given the ability to formulate their own laws 
and regulations provided that they do not contravene national 
laws.221 Local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are 
typically the entities responsible for actually implementing 
environmental laws, and are answerable to the national 
environmental agency (SEPA, or the State Environmental 
Protection Agency).222  But, these EPBs are under the direct 
control of their local governments, upon which they rely for 
funding, budgets, promotions, and even housing and office 
 
 219 Richard J. Ferris, Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Environmental Law in the 
People’s Republic of China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 66, 69 (Kristen A. Day ed., 2005). 
 220 Elizabeth Economy, Environmental Enforcement in China, in CHINA’S 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 102, 103 
(Kristin A. Day. ed., 2005); Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 310. 
 221 Ferris & Zhang, supra note 219, at 73. 
 222 Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 309–10. 
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space.223 Thus, the loyalty of the EPB is typically primarily to the 
local governments, which often are “more interested in promoting 
economic growth and increasing industrial production rather than 
enforcing SEPA policies that are viewed as anti-growth.”224 
The vesting of provinces with implementation and 
enforcement responsibility makes China’s law creation and 
enforcement mechanisms in practice resemble the EU’s fairly 
closely—a central authority passes broad overarching laws, but 
lower levels of government are charged with the majority of the 
implementation and the enforcement work. Thus, both the EU and 
China face the challenge of how to ensure that centrally passed 
laws are implemented properly by Member States or provinces 
with vastly different geographical and financial situations and 
varying levels of commitment to environmental objectives.225 
Despite these similarities, the institutions in charge of 
implementing national/Union-wide energy efficiency laws in 
China and the EU are quite different.  In the EU, responsibility is 
vested almost entirely within the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Transportation and Energy (DG-TREN), 
with technical research responsibilities shared with the 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Research.226 This 
arrangement ensures that energy efficiency policy is 
contextualized and implemented within overall energy policy, as 
DG-TREN is responsible for the entirety of EU Energy Policy.227 
In contrast, even at China’s central level alone, one researcher 
catalogued eight ministries and eleven departments currently 
involved in the formulation of energy policy.228 This split 
 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 310. See also Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 236–37 (discussing the fact 
that many Chinese localities and departments rank energy efficiency very low on 
the list of priorities, viewing it as a thankless investment). 
 225 See Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 309–10. 
 226 See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 
2009); European Commission, Research Directorate-General, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/research/index_en.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2009). 
 227 See Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, supra note 17. 
 228 Jimin Zhao, Reform of China’s Energy Institutions and Policies: 
Historical Evolution and Current Challenges 10–11 (BCSIA Discussion Paper 
2001–20, Energy Technology Innovation Project, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 2001), available at http://belfercenter. 
ksg.harvard.edu/files/zhao.pdf. 
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responsibility has reportedly made progress on energy efficiency 
laws difficult.229 China’s Energy Conservation Law (ECL) vests 
central authority over energy efficiency in the administrative 
department for energy conservation under the State Council, but 
less clearly calls for “[t]he departments concerned under the State 
Council [to] be responsible for energy conservation supervision 
and administration within the scope of their respective 
functions . . . .”230 
The structural similarities but factual differences between 
China’s and the EU’s energy efficiency administrations offer 
several suggestions for China. As it works to implement its revised 
ECL in the coming years, a few lessons that China might draw 
from the EU’s experience with its energy efficiency institutions 
include: 
 
1. Work to keep the administrative department for energy 
conservation from being marginalized. One key factor 
that has helped the European Commission prioritize energy 
efficiency and achieve significant savings is the fact that 
energy efficiency has not been marginalized and has 
remained within the purview of the same authorities 
responsible for implementing overall energy policy. While 
a delegation to a separate administrative department for 
energy conservation in China’s central government may be 
a necessity, the more this Authority is integrated into the 
overall energy policy-making body, the more energy 
efficiency is likely to be considered a viable energy supply 
option. 
2. Consolidate powers. Another institutional lesson that the 
EU has to offer is that vesting one agency with 
legislative, implementing, and enforcement authority 
leads to greater effectiveness and accountability. The 
European Commission drafts energy efficiency laws, 
oversees their implementation by Member States, and has 
full enforcement powers. These broad-ranging 
 
 229 Id. See also ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 103–04 (2004); Mingyuan, 
supra note 7, at 229. 
 230 Energy Conservation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 1997, amended Nov. 28, 2007), art. 10 (P.R.C.) 
(unofficial translation) (LawInfoChina.com through Nov. 28, 2007 amendment). 
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competencies empower the Commission to follow through 
on energy efficiency policy from beginning to end, and 
enable those tracking implementation to hold a single 
agency accountable for successes or failures. 
2. Law 
Given China’s relatively high energy intensity (recall that it 
uses five times more energy per dollar of GDP than the EU, and 
four times more than the US),231 there is an enormous potential for 
energy savings. China has recognized this, and in its most recent 
five-year plan it has set forth a goal of reducing its energy use per 
GDP 20 percent by 2010.232  This goal is incredibly ambitious, and 
will depend primarily on reforms in the industrial sector.233 
China’s industries consume close to 60 percent of total national 
energy demand, and are full of outdated production processes with 
low efficiency.234 There is also tremendous potential for efficiency 
improvements in buildings, which will be critical as China’s recent 
rapid growth has caused general energy demand to rise as more 
people can afford larger homes and more electricity-consuming 
appliances.235  At least at the national level, China has recognized 
the tremendous opportunities presented for energy saving and has 
responded with ambitious laws. Current strategies include 
numerous labeling laws and regulations,236 building codes,237 and 
 
 231 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 232 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CHINA’S QUEST FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 1 
(Working Paper, June 2006), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/ 
work/2006/gb/papers/ChinaQuest.pdf. 
 233 Id. 
 234 WANG YANJIA, ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY AND CO2 IN CHINA’S 
INDUSTRY: TAPPING THE POTENTIAL 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/28/36321399.pdf (draft report prepared for the 
Annex I Expert Group Seminar in Conjunction with the OECD Global Forum on 
Sustainable Development, held on March 27, 2006). 
 235 JIANG LIN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LABORATORY, ACHIEVING 
CHINA’S TARGET FOR ENERGY INTENSITY REDUCTION IN 2010: AN EXPLORATION 
OF RECENT TRENDS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS 22 (2006), available at 
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/china/publications/lbnl-61800.pdf. 
 236 See, e.g., LIN JIANG ET. AL., OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REP. NO. LBNL–50416, ENERGY 
EFFICIENT APPLIANCE LABELING IN CHINA: LESSONS FOR SUCCESSFUL LABELING 
PROGRAMS IN VARIED MARKETS 4 (2001), available at http://www.osti.gov/ 
bridge/servlets/purl/823725-8ZjLYT/native/823725.pdf. 
 237 See LIN ET AL., supra note 235, at 14. 
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laws targeting industrial efficiency.238  Energy efficiency has been 
primarily governed by the Energy Conservation Law since its 1998 
passage.239 In 2007, the Chinese government reaffirmed its 
commitment to energy efficiency by passing an updated version of 
this law240 with stronger regulations for transportation and 
construction and improved administrative oversight.241 
This note is primarily concerned with how China can better 
implement, enforce, and finance its energy efficiency laws as a 
whole.  Because of this broader focus, this note will not attempt to 
describe and catalogue the numerous laws and standards in this 
area.  While its numerous laws and its ambitious national energy 
efficiency targets make it seem as though China has come far in its 
energy efficiency policy, the critical challenge for China, with its 
powerful central Congress, is not passing ambitious measures. 
Rather, implementation and enforcement of these laws will be 
paramount to getting these tools to work in China—a revised and 
tightened but still largely hortatory ECL will otherwise have little 
practical effect.242 Recommendations on how to move from good 
laws on paper to good laws in practice is the topic of the following 
subsection on implementation. 
B. Implementation 
The harshest criticism of China’s 1998 Energy Conservation 
Law (ECL) is that it has been reduced “to a mere scrap of 
paper.”243  Others have asserted more mildly that the law is “based 
on clear principles but lack[s] implementation details,” and is 
implemented to widely varying degrees among provinces.244 
 
 238 See, e.g., YANJIA, supra note 234, at 22–26 (describing several strategies 
that China has developed for improving energy efficiency in industry). 
 239 Id. at 24. 
 240 Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 10. 
 241 See Siobhan Devine, Analysis: China Conservation Doubts Remain, 
UNITED PRESS INT’L, Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://www.upi.com/Energy 
_Resources/2008/02/22/Analysis_China_conservation_doubts_remain/UPI-
84921203712077/. 
 242 See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 227–28 (suggesting that the goals and aims 
of the ECL are far from being achieved, due largely to a lack of implementation 
and enforcement). See also Devine, supra note 241 (quoting Barbara Finamore 
of NRDC’s China Clean Energy project as explaining that the revised ECL’s 
effectiveness “is going to depend on how well it is implemented.”). 
 243 Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 228. 
 244 YANJIA, supra note 234, at 2. 
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Commentators seem to agree that there is a serious gap between 
the law as written and the law as applied, which is problematic 
given that the ECL depends upon “forceful execution of the 
supervisory and managerial duties of the government.”245 Key 
problems with the ECL include that it is “overly principle-oriented, 
lacking, or weak, in terms of enforcement measures;” it imposes 
no political supervision or accountability; and it has very vague 
and soft language.246  On the whole, one report estimates that “only 
6 percent of its articles have been implemented sufficiently, 60 
percent have been poorly implemented and 34 percent have not 
been implemented at all.”247 Furthermore, implementation varies 
widely among provinces and municipalities—whereas Shanghai 
has established an effective Energy Conservation Supervision 
Center that is locally financed, poorer provinces struggle to create 
effective bureaucracies and place energy efficiency low on their 
list of priorities.248  One of the reasons for this disparity is that the 
national government reportedly gives little guidance on how to 
implement its largely hortatory, vague energy efficiency laws.249 
The EU is far from perfect in the implementation of its energy 
efficiency laws, but its years of practice do provide some 
suggestions as to how implementation strategies used in the EU 
might be helpful to China: 
 
1. Create more accountability between the ‘layers’ of 
government. China, just like the EU, has a multi-layered 
institutional structure with territorial divisions at the 
centre, province, city, county, township, and village 
levels.250  Unlike the EU, though, its energy efficiency 
laws leave interpretation to local governments and do not 
provide much accountability of local governments to the 
central government to ensure implementation and 
enforcement.251 Having the national government authority 
 
 245 Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 226. 
 246 Id. at 231–32; see also YANJIA, supra note 234, at 2. 
 247 Qingyi, supra note 7, at 97 (citing Wang Qingyi, Ten Issues Regarding 
Energy Conservation in China, CHINA ENERGY, No. 5, 17 (2005)). 
 248 See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 234 & n.41, 237. 
 249 Cummings, supra note 4, at 10545. 
 250 See Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 310. 
 251 See, e.g., id. at 309–11 (explaining that local EPBs, though nominally 
responsible to SEPA, are actually under the almost full control of the local 
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focus its efforts on monitoring local agencies, rather than 
on directly inspecting implementation at the facility level, 
would allow more efficient use of limited national 
monitoring resources. Similarly, requiring careful reporting 
of goals and progress from local government agencies to 
the national government would create more accountability 
between layers of government. 
2. Require (or at least strongly encourage) formulation of 
local regulations and bylaws that transform the more 
hortatory national laws into concrete local obligations. 
The EU’s requirement that all Member States transpose 
EU-level directives into national law allows the 
Commission to directly track implementation and 
interpretation of its EU directives by each Member State. 
Given that more than twenty provinces, autonomous 
regions, and municipalities have already promulgated up to 
seventy bylaws on energy efficiency,252 this same 
requirement appears feasible in China, at least with the 
proper technical support at the national level. 
3. Focus on building institutional capacity and training 
individuals in energy efficiency in laggard provinces, 
municipalities, and autonomous regions. The EU has 
shared the same struggle as China in achieving even 
implementation of its energy efficiency laws across 
Member States, with many poorer Member States 
struggling to create and fund local agencies capable of 
ensuring compliance. While the EU is not a paradigm for 
dealing with this problem, it has redoubled its efforts to 
help bring laggard Member States up to speed. Ways in 
which this can be done include training local experts and 
providing templates and best practices for the form 
that exemplary local bylaws and regulations might 
take. This might be modeled on Intelligent Energy 
Europe’s “Implementing EU Appliance Policy in Central 
and Eastern Europe” Program, discussed supra Part 
I(C)(7). 
 
governments and suggesting that this problem is because of a lack of control of 
SEPA over local EPBs). 
 252 Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 234. 
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4. Require provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities to issue periodic progress reports and 
provincial/regional/municipal energy efficiency plans to 
the national Energy Conservation Authority. Require 
these plans to contain an evaluation of the 
implementation of all national energy efficiency laws to 
date, progress on any targets set, and a plan for future 
concrete steps to achieve these targets. The revised ECL 
calls for annual reports from local governments;253 the 
more clear the planning and evaluative responsibilities are 
for these reports, the more effective they are likely to be. 
While not directly imposing any new binding requirements 
themselves, these sorts of progress reports have proven 
very helpful in allowing the Commission to track 
implementation progress in each Member State, reducing 
the amount of direct investigatory work that the 
Commission must itself perform. 
5. Do not use the generalities contained in EU laws as a 
drafting guide—formulate complementary rules, 
specifications, standards, and guidelines at the national 
level that help transform the sometimes vague goals of 
the ECL into more concrete obligations where national 
uniformity in implementation is a desired goal. Unlike 
the EU, China has the constitutional ability to impose 
direct, discrete regulatory obligations as part of its national 
law.254  For areas where this sort of national uniformity is 
desirable, China could far surpass the EU in terms of the 
specificity of its laws. This is particularly true in areas that 
prove very controversial yet are easy to monitor for 
compliance, such as energy taxation laws. 
6. Make national technical expertise available to local 
authorities for technically complex issues. The EU found 
that one of the key reasons that its Buildings Directive had 
not been implemented was that there was a lack of 
technical expertise at the Member State level to formulate 
and implement appropriate national standards. For 
implementation problems that are predominantly technical 
 
 253 Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 5. 
 254 Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, 
Processes, Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 377 (2008). 
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in nature, a small staff of national experts acting as 
consultants and trainers could efficiently overcome local 
technical hurdles to local implementation. 
C. Enforcement 
Both the EU and China have struggled and continue to struggle 
with enforcement of energy efficiency laws. China’s ECL in 
particular has been criticized for failing to provide any real 
enforcement mechanisms—the law fails to clearly delegate 
implementation or enforcement responsibilities and does not 
provide punitive penalties for violations.255  In this respect, the EU 
can provide a useful guide through its struggles in getting Member 
States to internalize the responsibility for enforcing EU laws. The 
EU’s main enforcement leverage has come from building an 
intermediary enforcement mechanism into its laws, whereby the 
central EU government can take enforcement action against non-
compliant Member States.  Of course, such an intra-governmental 
enforcement mechanism works only to the extent that there is the 
political will at the central level to ensure provincial 
compliance.256 If China’s central government is in search of 
nothing more than lip service to energy efficiency, few 
recommendations from the EU will help it move towards stronger 
implementation and enforcement.257  However, to the extent that 
the central government actually wants to ensure achievement of its 
energy efficiency goals and devotes resources to doing so, a few 
lessons can be drawn from the EU’s experience that might help 
ensure successful enforcement: 
 
 255 See Mingyuan, supra note 7, at 233. 
 256 One recent article suggests that enforcement challenges stem from a 
combination of factors within and without of the central government’s control. 
See Adam Briggs, Note, China’s Pollution Victims: Still Seeking a Dependable 
Remedy, 18 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 315–16 (2006). To the extent that 
enforcement challenges stem from the “imprecise and often over-ambitious texts 
of the laws themselves” and a lack of resources at the central government level, 
id. at 312, only a more tangible commitment to energy efficiency at the central 
level can fix these problems. However, the problem is also largely driven by a 
“lack of willingness by self-interested local officials to enforce national laws at 
the local level,” id., and the E.U. does have some valuable insights to suggest 
ways of coping with this problem. 
 257 See, e.g., Sitaraman, supra note 8, at 273 (suggesting that one major 
problem facing China is “political unwillingness to undertake strong enforcement 
measures and prioritize environmental protection ahead of economic growth” 
despite a willingness to record strong formal laws). 
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1. Place concrete obligations directly on lower bodies of 
authority (i.e. provincial authorities), not simply on 
private entities, to create a direct enforcement chain. 
The central authority cannot realistically expect to monitor 
compliance and enforce the law against all non-compliant 
private entities. Recognizing this, the EU has chosen to 
focus its enforcement efforts at the intermediary stage of 
Member State obligations. 
2. To the extent feasible, create enforcement capabilities 
for the national body in charge of enforcing energy 
efficiency laws against the local authorities in charge of 
implementing the laws. The European Commission’s 
ability to bring Member States to the European Court of 
Justice has proven a powerful negotiating tool, enabling 
the Commission informally to ensure Member State 
compliance with the laws in almost all cases. A similar 
ability to take enforcement action against non-compliant 
provinces and to use the threat of such actions as a 
bargaining tool would empower much more intra-
governmental enforcement authority between national and 
local administrators. Including implementation timelines 
within energy efficiency laws has enabled the EU to be 
particularly successful in tracking implementation at the 
Member State level and in bringing enforcement actions 
against those countries lagging behind in implementation. 
3. Enforcement power works best when it is not confined 
to the national government and local authorities; 
legitimate private enforcement rights will ultimately be 
the most effective enforcement tool. The EU has 
struggled tremendously to actually achieve on-the-ground 
implementation of its energy efficiency laws—while the 
Commission takes action against Member States failing in 
their major obligations, it simply does not have the 
enforcement capabilities (and some argue, nor should it) to 
monitor local action on the ground across the EU. The EU 
has no good model to offer of private enforcement rights 
for energy efficiency, given that it chose not to create a 
direct right for private enforcement within its laws, and the 
ability to enforce these directives in national court absent a 
direct right is questionable.  However, the EU’s experience 
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does suggest that fostering greater individual enforcement 
by the public will be a critical component of achieving 
more robust enforcement of energy efficiency laws. 
Admittedly, the possibility of private rights of 
enforcement, namely through citizen suits, is still remote in 
China. However, a few environmental attorneys are 
experimenting with bringing suits and interest is growing 
in the use of the mechanism.258  While not a likely major 
avenue for near-term enforcement, many believe that the 
US’s success with citizen suits (and, conversely, the EU’s 
struggles in the absence of such suits) does offer valuable 
lessons to China in terms of future enforcement 
possibilities.259 
D. Financing 
Financing is often the critical hurdle for cost-effective energy 
efficiency projects actually getting off the ground—while it seems 
counterintuitive that cost-effective projects would not be 
implemented, the up-front costs and long payback times make a 
solid financing scheme an essential part of any energy efficiency 
strategy. The EU is still in the process of developing good energy 
efficiency financing practices, but is far enough along in 
experimenting with various options that it offers some good 
financing lessons: 
 
1. Target funds where they are most needed. Help 
empower poorer provinces and smaller projects to take 
advantage of international funding opportunities. The 
EU has recognized that it has countries with extremely 
divergent financing capabilities, and has increasingly 
targeted its aid towards those Member States most in need 
of assistance. Particularly for China, there is a large 
amount of international funding available for financing 
 
 258 See Patti Goldman, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in China: 
Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 253 (2007); 
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 24 (2007). 
 259 See Briggs, supra note 256, 325–26; Barbara Finamore, Maria McFarland 
& Wallace Showman, The Unprotected Environment: Case Studies Illustrating 
the Need for New Solutions, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 428, 435 (2004); 
Percival, supra note 258, at 24–25. 
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projects, but reports suggest that those municipalities most 
successful at obtaining international funds are the most 
environmentally conscious and active cities (Shanghai, 
Zhongshan, Dalian) that already have strong ties with the 
international community.260 As the EU has done, China 
might choose to target domestic aid towards poorer 
provinces and to help these provinces improve their ability 
to obtain international funding. 
2. Stretch relatively little public money to cover a large 
number of projects by using it innovatively. The EU’s 
Phare Program’s co-financing scheme, whereby public 
money covers only the interest that an energy efficiency 
project would otherwise pay, offers one model for 
effectively using relatively small amounts of public 
funding.261 
3. Encourage the development of ESCOs by dialoguing 
with them about policy barriers262 that exist to their 
ideal functioning. The EU has been increasingly 
successful in helping ESCOs to succeed, largely through 
surveying existing companies and addressing their policy 
concerns. China, in its preliminary stages of ESCO 
development,263 could similarly help to remove some of 
the key barriers to entry that its early ESCOs have 
experienced. The revised ECL “encourages” the 
development of ESCOs,264 but more concrete measures 
may be needed to help these entities enter the market.  For 
example, the EU has found that subsidies, dissemination of 
information and capacity building, national accreditation of 
ESCOs to enhance their credibility, and helping ESCOs 
 
 260 ECONOMY, supra note 229, at 120. 
 261 This project is discussed in more detail supra Part IV(A). 
 262 Some of the key barriers identified in the EU through surveying ESCOs 
include low awareness and lack of information about ESCOs, client skepticism, 
high perceived risk, high administrative hurdles and transaction costs, split 
incentives, and availability of financing. See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 
85–86. The barriers in China may prove to be similar to these, but a survey of 
existing ESCOs in China could more reliably pinpoint the precise challenges 
confronted there. 
 263 YANJIA, supra note 234, at 39.  
 264 Energy Conservation Law, supra note 230, art. 22. 
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acquire third-party financing have all contributed to the 
growing success of ESCOs in the EU.265 
4. Require energy efficiency to be a component of any 
national government-funded project. While the EU has 
not built this requirement into its allocation of Structural 
Funds, experts suggest that this would be an excellent way 
to make energy efficiency more of a priority in EU-funded 
actions.266 
5. Better align energy prices with energy costs. The EU has 
struggled with implementing minimum energy taxes, but 
has found more support from Member States for market-
signaling options such as real time pricing. Any steps that 
can be taken to have energy prices better reflect the true 
cost of energy consumption will help promote further 
energy efficiency. China might also carefully monitor the 
EU’s upcoming deliberations on whether to use white 
certificates for energy efficiency, though it probably should 
not yet opt in to this nascent market mechanism.267 
CONCLUSION 
Both China and the EU have a long way to go in achieving 
complete implementation of their laudable energy efficiency goals. 
However, in its first fifteen years of implementing energy 
efficiency policy, the EU has made impressive improvements and 
developed increasingly effective implementation, enforcement, 
and financing strategies. As China’s demand for energy burgeons 
over the next few decades, any and all steps that it can take to 
make energy efficiency a major part of its energy supply mix will 
have positive impacts on its environment and economy. Moreover, 
given that China is expected to account for 20 percent of the 
increased global energy demand and half the increased demand in 
 
 265 See BERTOLDI ET AL., supra note 209, at 87–89. 
 266 See, e.g., Streimikiene et al., supra note 189, at 1174. 
 267 This is both because the white certificate is a nascent, unproven market 
mechanism just gaining traction in Europe and not yet experimented with on a 
large scale, and because China probably still lacks the institutional capacity to 
run a white certificate program. See generally Ruth Greenspan Bell, What to Do 
About Climate Change, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2006, at 105, 112 (arguing that 
countries like China are not ready to implement Western economic tools like 
emissions trading—and by extension, white certificates—until assistance is 
provided “to build effective monitoring, inspection, and enforcement practices”). 
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coal over the next thirty years,268 any improvements in its energy 
efficiency will have important effects on global energy supply and 
prices and worldwide levels of greenhouse gas emissions.  But, the 
devil is in the details—the real challenge for both the EU and 
China is in transforming what they have already realized are 
excellent policy goals into fully implemented solutions across all 
levels of government.  This note’s goal has been to discuss some 
of the details that have plagued the EU and, by identifying these 
problems and any solutions that have been found, help China 
‘leap-frog’ some of the challenges that the EU has encountered.269 
These lessons that EU has learned in implementing, enforcing, and 
financing its energy efficiency policy have the potential to help 
China move from broad national goals to concrete local 




 268 ANGIE AUSTIN, ENERGY AND POWER IN CHINA: DOMESTIC REGULATION 
AND FOREIGN POL’Y 5 (Foreign Pol’y Ctr. 2005), available at 
http://fpc.org.uk/publications/153 (citing IEA statistics). 
 269 Cf. Cummings, supra note 4, at 10526. 
